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The regulatory compliance defense holds firms liable whose products or product 
warnings fail to satisfy federal regulatory standards, but does not exculpate firms that 
comply. Rather, compliance is relevant evidence for a jury to consider in a products 
liability action. This article argues that he defense should exculpate compliant firms 
as a matter of law. A Congress that thought about the matter would prefer this 
judicial construction of an unclear safety statute. To defend this view, the article 
argues that a legislature can have intentions i  a normatively meaningful sense, that 
claims that a Congress or its agencies are captured by special interests should be 
nonjusticiable, and that, when a court is in doubt as to what a legislature intended, 
it should adopt that construction of the relevant s atute hat would be easiest for the 
legislature to correct ifthe court errs. In this case, it is easier for Congress to correct 
a construction that it intended toexculpate compliant firms than a construction that 
it did not. 
This article considers the relevance for tort liability of a firm's com- 
pliance or noncompliance with a federal safety statute or regulation. This 
issue is worth studying for two reasons. First, there is a great deal of safety 
regulation, and firms regulated under federal aw are often sued in state 
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courts for producing allegedly defective products.1 Thus, the questions 
asked here have practical significance. Second, the appropriate preemp- 
tive reach of national safety laws implicates important issues of statutory 
interpretation a d federalism. Prior studies of what is called the "regu- 
latory compliance defense" slight these broader issues because they take 
a tort perspective. This article adds a public law perspective and argues 
from it that the defense should exculpate more firms than it now does. 
The argument is set in the United States context but is relevant o federal 
systems generally. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Law 
It is helpful to begin by clarifying what preemption can mean. Pre- 
emption has an institutional and a substantive aspect. Regarding the insti- 
tutional part, preemption can be (1) full: no state court or administrative 
agency can enter the field; (2) partial for administrative agencies: no state 
agency can regulate but a state's common law may operate in the area; 
or (3) partial for courts: a state agency can regulate but courts cannot en- 
tertain tort suits. When institutional preemption is partial, so that a state 
court or agency may enter, the doctrine's ubstantive aspect becomes rel- 
evant. Preemption can be (1) substantively full: a court (or agency) that 
is not institutionally preempted can hold a firm liable that has violated a 
relevant federal standard but cannot vary the standard or (2) substantively 
partial: a court (or agency) cannot permit firms to produce a level of safety 
that is below the federal standard but can require firms to produce more 
safety. 
Federal safety statutes commonly contain language prohibiting a "state 
or political subdivision of a state" from varying federal regulations re- 
specting product safety or product safety warnings. A popular addition 
to this prohibition permits a state to apply to the relevant federal agency 
for permission to vary the federal standard. Permission is to be granted if 
l.An extensive discussion of American safety regulation a d the American case 
law is in Ausness (1996, p. 1210). Ausness also reviews much of the legal literature 
on the subject. A similar survey is in Campbell (1998). 
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the proposed local regulation is more stringent than the federal standard, 
or is justified by local conditions, and does not unduly burden interstate 
commerce. A minority of statutes add to these provisions that a state's 
common law may continue to operate but do not clarify whether this 
permission relates only to institutional preemption or to substantive pre- 
emption as well. Almost no statute contains explicit language respecting 
the effect hat a firm's compliance with a federal regulation should have 
in a products liability case.2 
The state courts reject "partial for courts" institutional preemption and 
adopt partial substantive preemption. Thus, firms can commonly be sued 
in tort for producing defective products or giving defective warnings when 
a relevant federal statute or regulation exists. The majority rule in these 
law suits holds that a firm's failure to comply with a federal statute or reg- 
ulation is negligence per se, but compliance is not exculpatory as a matter 
of law. Rather, compliance is relevant evidence for a jury to consider when 
deciding whether the firm should be held liable in tort.3 
2. The Appendix briefly describes the preemptive provisions in the leading product 
safety statutes. The lack of explicit language r lating to tort liability has been remarked. 
A thoughtful commentator observed: "Congress, in enacting these [safety and regula- 
tory] schemes i rarely explicit about its intention to override state tort law," and "there 
is virtually nothing along the lines of systematic guidance from the federal courts  " 
Rabin (1997). Another commentator stated: 
When a manufacturer invokes the preemption doctrine as a defense to tort liability, 
the court must determine whether Congress intended toforeclose tort suits by injured 
consumers. This task is complicated bythe fact hat no federal product safety statute 
explicitly mentions whether such tort claims are preempted. (Ausness, upra note 1, 
p. 1226) 
The courts sometimes hold that ort suits are preempted but often do not. For exam- 
ple, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act generally does not preempt 
(see, e.g., Myrick v. Frehauf Corp, 1995); the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not 
preempt (see Viscusi, 1994); the Consumer P oduct Safety Act does not preempt (see 
Sherman, 1992); the 1969 cigarette smoking act arguably does not preempt (see Green, 
1997); but he Federal Boat Safety Act preempts (see Lewis v. Brunswick Corporation , 
1997); and state tort claims that cars are defectively designed if they lack airbags are 
preempted (see, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp , 1989). 
3. This law is authoritatively stated in Restatement of he Law (1997). 
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1.2. The Case for Current Law 
The state courts reject instititutional preemption because safety regu- 
lation is within a state's traditional police power.4 Regarding substance, 
courts need a rule of interpretation when a statute is unclear. The cur- 
rent interpretative rule takes safety statutes to enact, or to direct a federal 
agency to enact, minimum safety standards.5 The Restatement of Products 
Liability explains: 
[The law] reflects he traditional view that he standards set by most product safety 
statutes or regulations generally are only minimum standards. Thus, most product 
safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of safety below which product sellers 
fall only at their peril, but they leave open the question of whether a higher 
standard of product safety should be applied. 
This is the general rule, applicable in most cases. (Restatement of the Law, 
Comment e, 1997) 
The substantive aspect of the regulatory compliance defense that holds 
noncompliant firms liable is not controversial. The federal government 
has limited enforcement resources and so should welcome private enforce- 
ment unless prosecutorial discretion is an essential aspect of the regulatory 
scheme, or courts lack the competence to decide whether a firm has met 
the regulatory standard. Neither of these criteria for federal exclusivity 
seems met in the typical case in which a firm is sued for producing less 
safety than federal aw requires. 
It takes more argument to justify rejecting full substantive preemp- 
tion - i.e., for not exculpating compliant firms - but a good case exists. 
Initially, there is an argument from silence. If Congress can have inten- 
tions in the sense that individual persons do, then the failure of Congress 
explicitly to preempt state tort suits, when the preemption issue is well 
4. Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court held, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 
1996, that he Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 539, did not preempt 
all state tort actions. Justice Stevens began the opinion for the court by remarking, 
"Throughout o r history, the several states have xercised their police power to protect 
the health and safety of their citizens" ( id ., p. 475). 
5. All safety standards are minimal inthe sense that he government permits firms 
to make products safer or warnings clearer than the standard equires. The current rule 
of interpretation holds that federal safety standards are minimal inthe sense that he 
state courts cannot permit firms to satisfy a less demanding safety standard than that 
set by federal law, but can require firms to satisfy a more demanding standard. Inthis 
article, the phrase "safety standard" refers both to a regulation f product safety as 
such and to a regulation of product safety warnings. 
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known, implies that Congress wants these suits to proceed. Traditional so- 
cial choice analysis holds that legislatures cannot have intentions in the 
way that people do, however. Under majority rule, the same set of legisla- 
tor preferences sometimes will sustain a variety of legislative outcomes.6 
Lawyers should conclude from this possibility that legislatures enact laws 
but do not have "intentions." When a law's words are unclear, a court 
should choose the interpretation that the relevant social and political norms 
best imply.7 
The norms relevant o safety regulation arguably support the interpre- 
tative rule that an unclear federal statute should be read to enact minimum 
safety standards. One such norm is federalism. This norm is advanced by 
an interpretation that the national interest is satisfied when firms must sup- 
ply consumers with a reasonable amount of safety, and the local interest is
satisfied when the states are free to adjust safety levels upward to reflect 
local conditions. A second norm is efficiency. A regulator cannot fully 
foresee the circumstances in which safety standards will be tested. Prod- 
ucts liability suits give the state courts current and particular knowledge, 
which they can use to make optimal adjustments to federal regulations. A 
third norm is institutional integrity. Congress and the federal agencies can 
be captured by industry interests, who will then cause federal regulations 
6. A classic statement is 
... so long as a society preserves democratic institutions, its members can expect that 
some of their social choices will be unordered or inconsistent. And when this is true, 
no meaningful choice can be made. If [alternative] y is chosen - given the mechanism 
of choice and the profile of individual valuations - then to say that [alternative] x is
best or right is probably false. But it would also be equally false to say that y is best 
or right or most desired. And in that sense, the choice lacks meaning. (Riker, 1982) 
A less formal statement holds: 
The theory of majority c cling has interesting mplications for statutory interpretation. 
The most striking is that even text-based interpretation is hard to link up with majority 
preferences because there may be several equally plausible majority based preferences 
in the legislature ... the legitimacy of the statute isderived less from majoritarianism 
(this policy is what most legislators want) than from formalism (this text was agreed 
to by both chambers ofCongress and signed by the president). (Eskridge, 1994, p. 37) 
For an application f this view to tort law, see Chapman and Trebilcock (1992). 
7. This view is argued in Eskridge (1989). Cass Sunstein makes a similar claim: 
"Gaps should not be filled in and ambiguities resolved by references to values that 
counter those of the enacting Congress in particular and the modern regulatory state 
in general" (Sunstein, 1990, p. 142). See also Dworkin (1986). A concise summary of 
modern theories ofstatutory interpretation is in Färber and Frickey (1991, pp. 88-1 15). 
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to require too little safety. State tort law thus can protect the national po- 
litical process by raising the amount of safety firms must produce to the 
appropriate level.8 
1.3. The Better Interpretative Rule 
This article agrees that state courts should not be institutionally pre- 
empted but argues for a new interpretative rule that would require these 
courts to adopt full substantive preemption: courts applying the proposed 
rule would take Congress in the usual case to enact "national" rather than 
minimum safety standards.9 A national standard binds the states and so 
will exculpate firms that comply with it. The proposed rule of interpreta- 
tion rejects the current interpretative premise that Congress cannot have 
meaningful intentions respecting safety regulation. Rather, this article con- 
8. It is common to justify current law partly on the ground that Congress and its 
regulators a e captured by special interests. The explanatory note to §4 of the Restate- 
ment of Products Liability recites: "In arguing that compliance with agency prescribed 
warnings should not preclude liability in tort, some commentators have noted that rule 
making by agencies is often distorted by budgetary limitations, lobbying by special 
interests, and political pressures [citation]" {Id. at 149). The American Law Institute 
Reporters' Study, Enterprise R sponsibility for Personal Injury, also argued for a reg- 
ulatory compliance defense that is close to the current one partly on the ground that 
"the [typical] agency will be 'captured' by backdoor industry influence and adopt inad- 
equate regulations" (American Law Institute's Reporters' Study, 1991). Typical state- 
ments in the law reviews hold that "the process of enacting regulations is profoundly 
sensitive tospecial-interest pressures and politics, and it is hard to believe that safety 
regulations represent rational decisions about safety, rather than money politics . . . there 
will be cases when the result isa regulatory regime that is far too lenient on business 
defendants" (Luban, 1998); and "it is not desirable tohave biased agencies who are ac- 
countable toall sorts of political organizations mandate what he regulatory standards 
should be" (Warren, 1997). 
9. In this article, when Congress permits a state court o require firms to produce 
more safety than afederal regulation requires, the regulatory standard is referred to as a 
minimum. When Congress wants the safety level in a regulation to bind the state courts, 
the standard is referred to as "national." National standards are not necessarily optimal 
in the conomic efficiency sense; they are only optimal from Congress's viewpoint. An 
"optimal" national standard thus could sacrifice efficiency to equity. 
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tends that Congress has such intentions, which are held on two levels. A 
Congress that thought about the matter would have a first level preference 
for courts to apply national rather than minimum safety standards. This 
preference rests on three grounds. First, a single agency can coordinate 
regulation to avoid increasing safety in one product dimension at the risk 
of reducing it in another. Second, firms that sell nationally and must com- 
ply with one set of regulatory standards can exploit economies of scale in 
producing safety. Third, to identify optimal safety standards is a technical 
task, at which administrative agencies are more expert than courts. As a 
consequence, when a state does have local knowledge relevant o safety, 
an efficiency seeking Congress likely would permit state administrative 
agencies, but not state courts, to enter the field.10 
Congress also has a second level intention over the interpretative strate- 
gies that state courts should pursue.11 A legislature should prefer courts 
to choose the construction of an unclear statute that is easiest for the leg- 
islature to correct if the court errs. Applying this strategy here, when a 
federal safety statute is unclear a state court could make either of two 
interpretative errors: (1) the court could find that the statute required min- 
imum safety standards when the statute required national standards, or 
(2) the court could find that the statute required national safety standards 
when it required only minima. For reasons to be developed in detail be- 
low, mistake (2) is easier for Congress to correct than mistake (1). In 
summary here, a federal agency or a state court has autonomy if it can 
choose a policy that no other policy in the feasible set "majority defeats." 
A Congress that intended to enact a minimum safety standard knows that 
state courts will apply a higher standard on average. Hence, there likely 
will be a majority for raising the minimum if state courts mistakenly find 
that Congress intended to enact a national standard. On the other hand, if 
Congress did want an agency to choose a national standard and the state 
courts raise that standard on average, there may be no majority (it will 
10. This inference helps to explain why federal safety statutes sometimes permit 
state administrative agencies to request permission from the relevant federal agency to 
vary federal standards. Courts cannot make such requests. 
11. Cass Sunstein refers to and justifies a set of interpretative norms that he calls 
"interpretative instructions." These norms hold that "courts interpret statutes by con- 
cluding that Congress would prefer a particular interpretative s rategy" (Sunstein, supra 
note 7, p. 153). 
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be shown) that would vote to reverse. Therefore, if a state court is un- 
sure whether Congress intended full or partial substantive preemption, it 
should take Congress to have enacted full preemption (i.e., to have enacted 
a national safety standard). 
1 .4. Responses to the Case for Current Law 
The claim that legislatures cannot have intentions i overdrawn. Recent 
work in social choice theory shows that legislatures commonly choose 
statutes from the set of majority preferred policies.12 Although a legis- 
lature can have intentions in this sense, the argument from silence that 
Congress prefers never to preempt the state courts substantively is un- 
persuasive. As indicated above, federal safety statutes explicitly prevent 
states or political subdivisions thereof rom varying federal safety stan- 
dards (unless in some cases a federal agency approves a variance). A 
legislative intention to prevent state legislatures, city and county govern- 
ments, and state and local administrative agencies from raising federal 
safety standards, but to permit state courts to raise these standards, would 
be intelligible if either of two conditions were satisfied: (1) local courts 
are better safety regulators than the state institutions that are explicitly 
preempted or (2) local courts and juries better eflect he values of a state 
respecting safety than the explicitly preempted state institutions. It is ar- 
gued below, however, that state courts are relatively poor regulators and 
are less representative than state legislatures or local governments. Federal 
statutes omit explicitly to oust courts probably because Congress rejects 
institutional preemption. Congress, that is, could sensibly prefer the state 
12. Dworkin, supra note 7, argues that courts should not be bound by legislative 
intentions, ot because these do not exist, but because the courts' obligation to make 
the law globally coherent should induce a court o prefer the interpretation that renders 
a statute consistent with the body of statutory law generally to an interpretation that 
may better eflect the will of a particular enacting legislature. The requirement of 
global coherence may be justifiable when a common law court is reading common 
law precedents, for the court is then the keeper of its own law. It is more difficult to 
see how requiring the Congress to be consistent across election cycles is consistent 
with a commitment to democracy. Raz makes a similar point, arguing that "if the set 
of principles one is considering represents the dictates of authority, hey may fail to 
cohere and yet be valid because the authority is a legitimate one with power to bind its 
subjects" and that "The reality of politics leaves the law untidy  In countries with 
decent constitutions, the untidiness ofpolitics is morally sanctioned. It is sanctioned 
by the morality of authoritative institutions" (Raz, 1994). 
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courts to entertain damage suits for the violation of Federal standards to 
prevent the law from being underenforced and to ensure compensation 
to the victims of these violations. In brief, an intelligible public purpose 
seldom would be served by substantively preempting every local legal 
institution except courts, but intelligible public purposes commonly are 
served by not preempting local courts institutionally. Therefore, the argu- 
ment from silence turns out to support the case for substantive but not for 
institutional judicial preemption.13 
The three relevant norms of safety regulation, summarized above, also 
do not support the current ort law rule, that the state courts never are 
fully prempted. The first such norm was federalism, but the federalism 
justification for current law is weak. In the contexts at issue here, Congress 
has explicitly preempted "states and political subdivisions of states" from 
varying federal safety standards. Thus, a federalism defense of current law 
apparently must claim that safety regulation at the local level is desirable 
only if the state courts supply it. This is a weak claim because state courts 
are poor regulators relative to other local legal institutions. 
The second norm was efficiency, but the claim that state tort law is a 
useful supplement to efficiency based federal regulation will commonly 
fall on institutional grounds. The issue here is not whether state tort law 
should operate at all but whether state courts can improve the work of 
an efficiency seeking federal regulator. This is unlikely for two reasons. 
First, state courts and juries have fewer resources and less expertise than 
federal agencies have. Second, state juries are not asked whether a statute 
or regulation is efficient; hey are asked whether a product is less safe 
than the "ordinary consumer" would expect or poses a "risk" that exceeds 
its "benefits."14 These instructions do not state an efficiency test, and so a 
jury acting under them is unlikely to find the efficient safety level. 
13. There are two other versions of the argument from silence. First, the argument 
summarized in text above may have applied to the first litigated safety statute hat did 
not explicitly preempt state courts, but Congress continues not to resolve the issue. 
Congress's failure over time to correct what seems a misreading of its intent suggests 
that current doctrine is not a misreading. Second, courts should hold that Congress 
does not intend to preempt in order to force Congress to be explicit about what it does 
want. Neither of these versions of the argument from silence are persuasive (see Part 
3.3 infra.) 
14. For example, the standard California Jury Instruction regarding the claim that a
product is defectively designed provides that "A product is defective indesign: (1) If 
it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an 
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The third norm was institutional integrity, but the argument that spe- 
cial interest interventions in the political process justify partial substan- 
tive preemption cannot be taken seriously in the context of state court 
applications of federal statutes and regulations. While the national polit- 
ical process often is imperfect, the concept of capture, it will be argued 
below, is nonjusticiable except when there is fraud, concealment, or ac- 
tual corruption. To give the flavor of a complex argument, a claim that a 
statutory or administrative rule was the product of capture is a claim that 
"political market failure" occurred: a normatively undesirable statute was 
passed in consequence of the existence of invidious political factors. The 
question when a statute was the product of such factors or represented 
a normatively permissible compromise in a democracy, however, seldom 
is answerable with today's analytic tools. A state court's effective choice 
therefore is either to presume that all safety statutes (or regulations) are 
the product of bad political processes or that none are. The current rule of 
interpretation makes the former choice: the state courts today assume that 
the national political process always is biased downward as regards afety 
so that they may raise regulatory safety levels unless explicitly prohib- 
ited. An assumption that national safety statutes usually lack legitimacy 
seems precluded by the supremacy clause. Hence, the state courts should 
presume that the national government has acted appropriately.15 
Part 2 below first defends the concept of a legislative intention. Part 
3 next argues for an interpretative rule that takes Congress, in the ab- 
sence of good evidence, to intend to enact national safety standards. Part 
4 then justifies putting the intellectual burden of proof on those who op- 
pose preemption by developing and illustrating the application here of the 
interpretative rule that courts should choose the linguistically plausible 
construction of a statute that is easiest for the legislature to correct if it 
intended orforeseeable manner; or(2) If there is a risk of danger in the design which 
outweighs the benefits ofthat design." The instruction s cited in Cupp (1997). 
15. In analyzing a similar problem, Jerry Mashaw states, "In some sense, all legis- 
lation is special interest legislation." As a consequence, a court exercising rationality 
review should strike a statute only when (1) the statute exhibits "the lack of a coher- 
ent and plausible public purpose" and (2) "the underlying structure of competition in 
the political market place suggests that self-correction is u likely." That is, "there must 
also be probable gislative failure" (Mashaw 1997, pp. 66, 75-76). Mashaw does not 
flesh out the concept of legislative failure. This article argues that his would have been 
hard to do under the current understanding. 
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intended a different result. Part 5 analyzes the capture concept. Part 6 is 
a conclusion. There have been a large number of articles in the scholarly 
and popular press that assess the justice and economic efficiency of Prod- 
ucts Liability Law. This article takes a different tack, to suggest that an 
important part of this law may lack political egitimacy. 
Before developing the case for this conclusion, a final comment about 
the argument may be helpful. This article argues for a shift in the burden 
of proof regarding the effect of federal safety standards. The current state 
law rule is strong: Section 4 of the Restatement recites that "a product's 
compliance with an applicable safety statute or administrative regulation 
is properly considered [by the jury] . . . but such compliance does not pre- 
clude as a matter of law a finding of product defect." The state courts 
thus do not ask, in particular cases, whether a court has a comparative 
advantage over an administrative agency in creating the type of rule at is- 
sue; rather, cases routinely are sent to juries to decide whether products 
are defective. The interpretative rule argued for here would require a state 
court to find compliance with a federal safety statute or regulation to be 
exculpatory as a matter of law, unless the court identified reasons of com- 
parative institutional competence or federalism that could plausibly have 
led a public regarding Congress to delegate to tort law a portion of the 
regulatory task. The burden of proof should shift in favor of preemption 
in this way, it is argued here, because these reasons are absent in the com- 
mon case. The proposed interpretative rule sometimes would permit the 
state courts to function substantively though the federal government had 
previously acted, but full preemption would be the usual result. 
2. The Condorcet Problem, the Core and Legislative Intent 
Part 2 makes a general argument, using safety regulation as an example, 
that a legislature can have intentions in a normatively meaningful sense. 
The argument is meant to justify claims that take the form, "A Congress 
that thought about the matter would prefer  " Whether these claims are 
persuasive turns on their own merits. 
American legislatures commonly use majority rule to make social 
choices. This method requires a polity with n voters to choose policy x 
over policy y if a simple majority (n/2 + 1 ) prefers x. Majority rule al- 
ways picks a winner when there are two choices but may not be decisive 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 American Law and Economics Review V2 N1 2000 (1-57) 
when the option set expands. Majority rule proponents argue that, for 
large choice sets, the policy that beats every other policy in a pair wise 
vote is the majority's preference. This view has intuitive appeal, and the 
policy that passes the test is called the Condorcet winner.16 A Condorcet 
winner will not always exist for complex social decisions, however. 
To explore the relevance of this possibility, assume that the prefer- 
ences of each voter in a legislature are complete (the voter has preferences 
over all of the feasible alternatives), consistent, continuous, and convex.17 
These assumptions imply that the set of preference maximizing alterna- 
tives for each voter is not empty and that the voter's utility declines as 
outcomes move in "policy space" away from her ideal policy in any di- 
rection. An example illustrates how there may not be a Condorcet winner 
for a complex social decision. In the example, a three-person legislature 
is to supply an administrative agency with criteria for regulating automo- 
biles. The choice is three-dimensional: the agency is to consider safety, 
handling ability, and fuel economy. One policy choice, labeled x , is to in- 
struct he agency to rank product safety first. A second policy, denoted 
y, would instruct the agency to rank good handling qualities highest. The 
third policy, z, ranks fuel economy first. That legislator 1 prefers policy 
x to policy y is written x Px y. Then assume this legislative "preference 
profile": 
X Pi y Pi z 
yP1zP1x 
zP3xP3y 
16. See Mueller (1989, p. 114). "If one finds the properties of majority rule most 
attractive, then failure to select he Condorcet winner when one exists may be regarded 
as a serious deficiency of a procedure." 
17. An individual's preferences are continuous if when the individual prefers alter- 
native jc to alternative y, there xists an alternative w sufficiently close to x and an 
alternative z sufficiently close to y such that he individual also prefers w; to z. The 
individual's preferences are (strictly) convex if when the individual prefers x to y, for 
any policy alternative z lying on the straight line between x and y , the individual also 
prefers z to y (see Varían, 1992). As an example of convexity, if policy * is spending 
a lot on education a d policy  is spending a little, a person's preferences are strictly 
convex if when the person prefers spending a lot to a little, the person also prefers 
spending a moderate amount to a little. The argument in text assumes that a maxi- 
mum exists in the legislative oting ame, which implies the further assumption that 
the relevant choice sets are compact. 
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There is no Condorcet winner in a three-person legislature with this 
preference profile. Policy x defeats y because legislators 1 and 3 prefer 
X to y' policy y defeats z because legislators 1 and 2 prefer y to z; 
but policy z defeats x because legislators 2 and 3 prefer z to x. When 
there is no Condorcet winner, the result of any one vote cannot represent 
the legislature's will: for any technologically feasible policy there exists 
another feasible policy that defeats it in a pairwise vote according to that 
same legislative will. 
This type of result is thought to pose serious difficulties for the project 
of finding legislative intent. To begin to see why this view is overdrawn, 
define the set of best (maximal) policy choices given a particular prefer- 
ence profile and a voting aggregation rule (such as majority rule) as the 
"core" of the aggregation rule under the preference profile. A "core pol- 
icy" cannot majority defeat other core policies but will majority defeat 
every noncore policy. The example just set out illustrates an empty core: 
under the assumed preference profile, no policy could majority defeat all 
of the other policies in pairwise votes. 
The Condorcet problem is a function of the complexity of the 
decision - the number of dimensions - relative to the number of voters. 
If the choice is two-dimensional orevery voter has the same preferences, 
then the problem vanishes. As a consequence, the Condorcet problem 
disaggregates into two questions: (1) Given the choice task, are there leg- 
islative preference profiles that will exhibit he Condorcet problem? That 
is, is it possible for there to be no core? (2) If the lack of a core is a 
possible outcome of majority rule, what is the chance that the outcome 
of a particular vote was not a Condorcet winner? 
Recent work in social choice theory shows that while the Condorcet 
problem almost always can exist, typical legislative preference profiles 
will have a Condorcet winner. Respecting this "possibility result," if a pol- 
icy choice requires considering d dimensions and there are n voters, then 
when d > 3(/l~3> , almost all preference profiles will exhibit he problem.18 
In the example above, in which d and n both equaled 3, this inequality is 
satisfied, so almost every possible preference profile can lack a Condorcet 
winner. 
18. See Austen-Smith andBanks (1997) for a review. 
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Turning from possibilities to probabilities, the smaller is the choice set 
(the fewer the number of dimensions in policy space) relative to the num- 
ber of voters, the more likely is a preference profile to have a Condorcet 
winner. Calculating the probability of a Condorcet winner for possible 
preference profiles is computionally difficult, but recent work suggests 
that winners commonly exist. There are two studies. One found that when 
all voter preferences are equally likely (the "impartial culture" assump- 
tion), the probability of a Condorcet winner when there are three choice 
dimensions and three voters is .9444 (Gehrlein, 1998). The second study, 
using a different methodology with similar assumptions, obtained the iden- 
tical result (Van Deerman, 1999). 19 In the usual legislature, there are many 
more voters than there are dimensions to the typical policy choice. These 
studies thus strongly suggest that the typical statute is a Condorcet win- 
ner. Moreover, if there is no Condorcet winner for a particular preference 
profile but the number of voters is large relative to the dimensionality of 
the policy space, majority rule commonly generates social choices that lie 
within the "uncovered set." Letting M indicate that a policy majority de- 
feats another technically feasible policy, the uncovered set is the set of 
points Jt within the policy space S such that for any other alternative y in 
S either x My or there exists a z in S such that xMzMy (Mueller, 1989, 
pp. 185-89; Miller, 1997). Because points in the uncovered set majority 
defeat points outside, the points in the set are equivalent to Condorcet 
winners (Ordeshook, 1986).20 As a theoretical matter, then, the likelihood 
19. The probability figure in text was calculated for linear preference orderings, 
which require a voter to have strict preferences over all the alternatives in the choice 
set. A weak preference ordering also is linear but permits the voter to be indifferent 
as between some of the choices. If voter preferences can be weak orderings, the prob- 
ability that a Condorcet winner exists for the three-voter, hree-dimension case rises 
to above 99%. This is because adding indifference increases the possible number of 
voting outcomes but does not increase the number of preference profiles without a 
Condorcet winner. As regards the intuition for the probabilities above, the preference 
profile in text had no Condorcet winner, but there is such a winner - it is x - for this 
preference profile: xP]yP]Z;xP2zP2y;zP^xP^y. It can be shown that here are 216 pos- 
sible linear preference orderings in the three- voter, three-dimensional case nd 12 lack 
a Condorcet winner. Hence, the probability that here is such a winner is
20. Sophisticated voters, uch as legislators, will not be led by agenda manipulation 
to choose points outside the uncovered set (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1984). 
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that a particular legislative outcome is in the core - that it reflects the 
legislative will - is sufficiently high to make plausible the claim that the 
outcome reflects the legislature's intention. 
There remain two further theoretical remarks and a practical remark. 
As to theory, it can be shown formally that core points are Nash equilibria. 
To understand this informally, realize that if the legislative status quo did 
not reflect a core policy, the legislature could vote to overturn the status 
quo in favor of a new policy, for there would be another feasible policy 
that would beat the status quo in a majority vote. If the legislature once 
chose a core policy, however, then this choice would be stable. Continuing 
with theory, the core may contain more than one policy choice. The size 
of the core is a function of decisional complexity, the number of voters, 
and voter heterogeneity. If the core has more than one element, structural 
considerations commonly determine the policy the legislature will choose. 
For example, a legislative committee with gatekeeping power (the power 
not to report proposals) can permit the whole body to vote on some core 
policies but not others.21 
As for practice, the modern scholarly tendency is to generalize from an 
example in which the core is absent given a selected three- voter preference 
profile over a three-dimensional policy space to the conclusion that leg- 
islative outcomes eldom correctly aggregate the preferences of individual 
legislators. As just shown, the generalization is incorrect. The choice in 
the auto safety example that began this part had three dimensions and the 
Congress has several hundred voters. As a consequence, an actual statute 
that sets criteria for regulating automobiles would be a Condorcet win- 
ner with a high probability; that is, the statute would reflect Congress's 
intentions regarding car safety, in the nontrivial sense that Congressional 
procedures picked the statute from the set of majority preferred statutes. 
21. It may be thought that he power of legislative committees to keep proposals 
from coming to a vote implies that some statutes embody stable noncore points. This 
view is plausible but unlikely because there are gains from trade. Since core points 
are majority preferred, there will be a deal entailing a committee's release of a core 
proposal (when it would overturn a oncore proposal) that would make all legislators 
better off. 
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The question taken up next is what intention Congress probably has re- 
garding judicial preemption when a safety statute is silent on the issue. 
3. The Appropriate Interpretative Rule 
Part 3 argues that courts should interpret unclear safety statutes to re- 
quire full substantive preemption because this is the probable legislative 
intent. The search for intent, it should be said at the outset, should be con- 
ducted subject to this constraint: courts hould presume that the legislature 
was pursuing a public purpose.22 To see how this constraint operates in 
the analysis here, Congress may have explicitly preempted all local le- 
gal institutions except courts in order to shift wealth to the trial lawyers, 
but shifting wealth to the trial lawyers is not a public purpose. Congress, 
however, may be pursuing a safety goal and believe that the state courts 
can pursue this goal effectively while other state institutions cannot. An 
argument that a Congress interested in pursuing safety could not plausi- 
bly hold such a belief thus counts in this article as an argument in favor 
of full substantive preemption. 
3.1. The Substantive Argument for National Standards 
Three considerations support the claim that Congress prefers national 
standards as a general matter. First, when a safety statute does not men- 
tion state courts, the question whether Congress meant to preempt these 
courts substantively turns on what Congress was attempting to achieve. 
A Congress that wants to permit the states to experiment with forms 
of safety regulation cannot also want to preempt state institutions from 
experimenting. Safety statutes commonly preempt almost every state in- 
stitution, however, which suggests that Congress has rejected significant 
local experimentation. Second, the existence of a federal statute and a 
federal regulatory agency imply that Congress has a preference for regu- 
lations that have national scope. Regarding the third consideration, federal 
22. The justifications for this interpretative constraint are thoughtfully set out in 
Macey (1986). This article also assumes: (1) a statute or regulation exists that was 
meant to regulate the product feature that has been challenged in a state law suit; (2) 
there has been no major, relevant technological hange since the statute or regula- 
tion was enacted; and (3) regulated firms did not withhold material information from 
Congress or an agency. When one or more of these assumptions fail, the state courts 
should be free to create their own regulatory standards. 
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statutes tate that their goal is to increase safety, but the pursuit of safety 
simpliciter is not an intelligible goal. For example, a regulation could re- 
duce accidents involving knives by ordering knives to be dulled, but the 
resultant product would not be a knife. As a consequence, this article takes 
Congress to want its agencies to produce regulations that make optimal 
tradeoffs between safety and product utility, but also to attach weight to 
the federalism norm. 
An effective pursuit of optimal product safety often will require na- 
tional regulation. Uniformity reduces costs because there commonly are 
economies of scale to production. As a consequence, when firms are re- 
quired to produce different versions of a product to comply with different 
state safety standards, each item will be more expensive than it would 
otherwise have been, and some items may not be produced at all. A sin- 
gle standard thus will often make the best tradeoff between safety and 
the other benefits that consumers could derive from a product. In addi- 
tion, increasing the safety of a particular product attribute could make the 
product less safe as a whole unless other attributes also are modified. This 
argues for a coordinated form of regulation that the different s ates could 
not supply. 
There are four responses to the claim that a Congress pursuing optimal 
safety would enact national safety standards.23 Each response attempts to 
show that efficiency is best achieved with a federal minimum standard that 
state courts are free to raise. The first response holds that local knowledge 
can be helpful when devising optimal safety regulations. California regula- 
tors may know more about surfboards and Minnesota regulators may know 
more about snowmobiles than regulators in Washington, DC, do. These 
products seem exceptional, however. Local knowledge would be unlikely 
to improve safety standards for swing sets, toasters, lawn mowers, bicy- 
cles and other typical consumer products. Also, answers to the question 
what instructions will best avoid accidents eldom will turn on the state in 
which the product is used. Swing sets and toasters are forseeably misused 
in much the same ways everywhere. Therefore, if the efficiency justifica- 
tion for national uniformity persuades, partial substantive preemption - the 
federal government sets only minimum standards for surfboards - should 
be the exception, not the rule. The remaining efficiency arguments for 
23. Part 3.2 discusses federalism issues separately. 
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partial preemption fail because courts and juries cannot regulate product 
safety as well as administrative agencies can. Therefore, the states should 
act only when the federal government has not. 
The first efficiency argument for partial preemption implicitly assumes 
that there is an optimal safety standard for each product. Juries, wher- 
ever situated, always apply this standard correctly. When juries never err, 
federal regulation is unnecessary: tort law alone will induce potential in- 
jurers to produce the optimal amount of safety. This result assumes that 
no potential injurer is wealth-constrained, however. When this assumption 
is relaxed, a need for minimum standards emerges. To see why, realize 
that potential injurers will invest in safety until the marginal cost equals 
the marginal reduction in their expected wealth from liability judgments. 
Therefore, when a potential injurer' s total wealth is less than the social 
cost of the accidents he may cause, he will invest too little in safety. A 
federal minimum standard would induce wealth-constrained firms at the 
low end of the risk spectrum to produce more safety but, because the 
standard is low, would not affect he safety choices of the affluent firms. 
This justification for minimum safety standards is hard to satisfy in 
practice. There usually is uncertainty as to how juries will apply the vague 
liability standard (i.e., the risk benefit est) that now obtains for products. 
When such uncertainty exists, tort law will not necessarily induce firms 
to take optimal safety precautions. Also, the firms that are the usual de- 
fendants in products liability actions commonly are adequately insured. 
When firms have sufficient wealth but there is uncertainty in the ap- 
plication of the tort standard, there is a second argument for a federal 
minimum.24 The case rests on two assumptions: while a particular jury 
can err, juries choose the efficient safety standard on average, and un- 
certainty in the application of the standard causes firms routinely to un- 
dercomply. Part 4 will show that enacting a minimum safety standard 
induces firms to increase the amount of safety they produce. Hence, if 
firms do undercomply with the single optimal standard that everywhere 
obtains (on average), passing a national minimum safety regulation will 
push firms toward efficiency. This argument is problematic partly because 
it is unknown whether firms routinely undercomply with current ort law. 
24. The analysis here and in Part 4 draws from Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) 
and Craswell and Calfee (1986). 
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These arguments for a minimum standard are problematic on a deeper 
level: they implausibly assume that state courts and juries will choose eco- 
nomically efficient safety standards, either always or on average. To see 
why this assumption is implausible, it is helpful to describe an efficiency 
seeking regulator's task. This regulator would choose the product design 
or safety input that maximized the sum of producers' and consumers' sur- 
plus. Roughly speaking, producer surplus is the difference between the 
product's price and its marginal cost; consumer surplus is the difference 
between the consumer's utility from use of the product and its price. The 
sum of these surpluses is the social welfare that a particular design would 
yield. To choose the regulation - the product design - that maximizes pro- 
ducer and consumer surplus requires the regulator to know the set of tech- 
nically feasible designs, the cost of producing each design, the price that 
each design will trade for in the market (which requires the regulator to 
know how consumer demand responds to price), and how consumer pref- 
erences are distributed across product attributes, including safety. Because 
consumers likely will have different preferences, a regulator who knows 
all of these things must then solve a complex maximization problem.25 
Juries are likely to be poorly informed about demand elasticities (how 
price affects the quantity consumers demand), possible product designs, 
and their cost and consumer preferences over product attributes and could 
not estimate solutions to the relevant maximization problem. The regula- 
tor, in contrast, will be better informed about the relevant variables be- 
cause there are economies of scale to regulation. The regulator compares 
the cost of learning about product designs, production costs, possible fu- 
ture prices, and consumer preferences to the total social gain from pro- 
ducing optimally safe products. The parties in a lawsuit compare the cost 
of learning about the facts to the marginal increase in the expected value 
of winning when the jury is better informed. In the usual case, the par- 
ties will truncate their research program before the regulator would. Also, 
regulators are, or could be, trained to solve or estimate solutions to com- 
plex maximization problems. Further, as the Introduction i dicated, actual 
juries are not asked to identify the optimal safety standard. Rather they 
are asked whether the litigated esign satisfied consumer expectations or 
25. An idea of how complex this problem is can be gathered from Pakes and 
McGuire (1994, 1996). 
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created risks in excess of its benefits. These are not efficiency tests. The 
point here, in sum, is not that courts are worse than nothing; it is that 
they are worse than administrative agencies created to perform particular 
regulatory tasks. 
The third efficiency argument for partial substantive preemption holds 
that tort suits give state courts and juries current information about the 
effect of safety regulations. For example, a lawsuit may disclose that there 
are more accidents under a regulation than the federal agency predicted. 
The common law is necessary because regulations become obsolete. This 
claim cannot justify current law, however, because courts permit juries to 
find that recent regulations mistakenly require too little safety (as opposed 
to having once been correct but having become outmoded). 
The argument from current knowledge may support the regnant rule, 
however, if the common law can force technological change faster than the 
administrative process can. There are two issues: (1) How quickly does a 
safety problem become known? (2) How quickly does the state respond? 
The argument from current knowledge assumes that accidents alone do 
not convey information; rather, lawsuits are necessary. This claim seems 
strained as regards products because agencies are directed to keep up; 
they can impose reporting requirements on firms; and Congress likely 
will impose significant costs on an agency that neglected what turned out 
to be a regulatory disaster. Turning to question (2), there usually is a 
two- to four-year wait in state court from the time a complaint is filed 
to trial, and then, if the problem is new, there likely will be an appeal. 
Also, juries may differ, so a firm that loses the first case may want to try 
again before making a major investment in safety. In contrast, an agency 
can settle the issue with one rule. The argument from current knowledge 
is unpersuasive because courts lack a comparative advantage at learning 
about new dangers and because the common law usually works more 
slowly than the administrative process. 
3.2. Federalism 
Federalism concerns will support an efficiency case for minimum stan- 
dards when (1) all citizens are entitled to a certain amount of the relevant 
good or service; (2) competition among the states may yield equilibria 
in which the amount is not supplied (for example, states may compete 
for firms by lowering safety or environmental standards); (3) local val- 
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ues may differ as to the appropriate amount to be supplied; and (4) local 
regulation will not externalize costs to other states. The former two cri- 
teria make the case for a federal presence, the third criterion implies that 
the presence should be a floor, and the last is a constraint on the pursuit 
of local values.26 The first wo of the four criteria just listed can justify 
federal safety regulation. The third criterion - to defer to local values re- 
garding the optimal amount of safety to supply - often is inconsistent with 
the fourth, however. The relevant local value relates to risk: a state may 
be more risk averse on behalf of its citizens than other states are.27 
There are two reasons to think that Congress would not want states 
to act on this preference. First, states that require products to be made 
safer than the federal standard may impose costs on the citizens of other 
states. As said above, if a large state prefers higher safety standards than 
smaller states and it is impractical for a national manufacturer tomake 
different versions of the product, then the citizens of smaller states may 
have to consume more safety than they would like. Similarly, if enough 
small states prefer more safety than some larger states do, then big state 
citizens may be bound by the preferences of small state citizens.28 A state 
could internalize part of the costs of a strong concern for safety by using 
other forms of regulation. As examples, a state could run safety education 
programs or regulate product use. Injuries from off-road vehicles thus 
could be reduced by restricting the areas in which the vehicles can be used 
as well as by making the vehicles safer, and bicycle accidents also could 
be reduced by regulating usage and by requiring riders to wear helmets. 
These regulations would impose costs on in-state citizens but not on the 
26. Some state punitive damage decisions recently have been argued to violate the 
cost externalization constraint (see Rubin, Calfee, and Grady, 1997). 
27. A state also could be less risk-averse. Safety apparently is a normal good, so 
the citizens of poor states may prefer less safety than the citizens of rich states. This 
implies that a state should be free, in tort suits, to permit firms to produce less safety 
than the relevant ational standard equires. This possibility is not pursued here because 
Congress is so commonly taken to set floors, but a fuller treatment of federalism issues 
would ask whether states should be free to lower national standards as well as to raise 
them. 
28. Recent data suggest that elected state judges attempt to redistribute wealth from 
out of state firms to in-state plaintiffs, and that his tendency is strongest for poor states 
(see Tabarrok and Heiland, 1999). Since poor states are usually small, if the state courts 
attempt to redistribute with rulings that firms have supplied insufficient safety and so 
should be held liable, the possible danger described inthe text would be real. 
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citizens of other states. In brief, regulating how a product is used and 
regulating the product itself are partial substitutes. As a general matter, 
regulating use is less likely to externalize costs to other jurisdictions than 
is regulating the product. Hence, Congress probably would prefer states 
with an above average concern for safety to regulate use. This preference 
would imply full substantive preemption for courts because courts eldom 
can regulate use effectively (they cannot set traffic rules, for example). 
The second reason for Congress to reject partial preemption is that 
courts are the least representative local institution. A Congress that wanted 
to defer to local values regarding safety would prefer to have state, county, 
or city governments make the requisite tradeoffs. The members of these 
governments are elected more frequently than judges, commonly run in 
contested elections, and as a consequence of these factors have more con- 
tact with voters than either judges or the members of particular juries 
will have. 
To summarize, if Congress is pursuing optimal safety subject to a fed- 
eralism constraint, itwould want full substantive preemption for the state 
courts in the usual case. To be sure, Congress may enact particular statutes 
that pursue other goals or are subject to different constraints, and then the 
case for preemption may weaken. The current preemption rule is stated 
on a high level of generality, however. When the most widely acceptable 
safety goal is analyzed on that level, this rule should change. 
3.3. The Argument from Silence Revisited 
The argument to here holds that a Congress pursuing a public purpose 
could not intelligibly preempt substantively every local legal institution 
except a state court.29 The failure to mention courts in safety statutes 
29. Justice Breyer's concurrence in the Medtronics ca e also makes this point. The 
statute at issue in the case stated that "no state may establish . . .with respect to a 
[medical] device . .. any requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any 
[federal] requirement" (21.U.S.C. §360k(a)). Justice Breyer argued: 
Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal MDA regu- 
lation requires a 2-inch wire, but a state agency requires a 1-inch wire. If the federal 
law embodied in the "2-inch" MDA regulation pre-empts the state "1-inch" agency 
regulation, why would it not similarly pre-empt a state-law tort action that premises li- 
ability upon the defendant manufacturer's failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award 
by a jury persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1-inch wire is negli- 
gent)? The effects ofthe state agency regulation a d the state tort suit are identical. To
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thus should be taken to reflect a judgment in favor of private enforce- 
ment of public law, not a delegation to supplement that law. The argu- 
ment from silence has two other versions that deserve mention. First, 
courts should read statutes as not preempting in order to force Congress 
to be explicit about its preferences. The analogy is to the private law 
canon that documents hould be construed against the drafter. This is 
a weak claim. To see why, suppose that the statute's words would per- 
mit any of five possible solutions to a regulatory problem. Then there 
are two possibilities: (1) the court knows which solution the legislature 
wanted, or (2) the court does not know. If the court knows, it should 
read the statute to enact that solution. If the court does not know, then 
any construction will have the same forcing effect. If, say, the legislature 
actually wanted solution two (of the possible five), it would be as mo- 
tivated to speak clearly if the court picked solution one as if the court 
picked solution three. A commitment to legislative supremacy thus im- 
plies that the court should make the best guess as to what the legislature 
did want or, preferably, should apply the interpretative canon developed 
in Part 4 below. 
The second version of the argument from silence holds that a legisla- 
ture that continually refuses to settle the issue must prefer the law that 
has emerged to fill the gap. This argument does not get very far. Congress 
is not a person whose identity endures through time but a collective en- 
tity whose particular make up changes over election cycles. Hence, the 
question is what the Congress that passed the statute at bar wanted. This 
Congress may know that past Congresses failed to clarify the preemp- 
tion issue in contexts other than the one before it. Knowing this, however, 
would be unlikely to overcome a public regarding Congress's preference 
for full substantive preemption. This is because there seldom would be a 
public regarding purpose that could justify the delegation of substantial 
regulatory power to the state courts to alter federal regulations while at 
the same time not delegating such power to more competent and repre- 
sentative local institutions. 
distinguish between them for pre-emption purposes would give greater power (to set 
standards "different from, or in addition to," federal standards) toa single state jury 
than to state officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking pro- 
cesses. Where Congress likely did not focus specifically upon the matter, ... I would 
not take it to have intended this anomalous result. (518 U.S. p. 504) 
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4. A Structural Rule for Resolving Unclear Cases 
When doubt remains as to what the legislature wanted, a court should 
choose that meaning that would be easiest for the legislature to correct 
if the reading is erroneous. Part 4 develops and applies this claim in two 
steps. First, it introduces the problem of "policy drift." This problem exists 
when a court or agency can choose a policy that the legislature either 
(1) cannot reverse though the legislature wrote the governing statute to 
implement another policy or (2) can reverse but at the cost of choosing 
a policy other than the policy that animated the governing statute. The 
policy drift problem is regarded as serious in the relationship between 
Congress and the federal agencies. Part 4.1 argues that the problem is 
acute in the relationship between Congress and the state courts. Part 4.2 
then argues that a Congress that thought about the matter would want 
state courts to use interpretative strategies when construing federal safety 
statutes that minimize the risk of policy drift. 
4.1. Policy Drift 
Consider a simple model of the relation between the Houses of 
Congress, the President, and an administrative agency that is created to 
regulate product safety.30 The agency's rules are subject to judicial re- 
view by federal Courts of Appeal. In the model, the agency can have 
independent policy preferences, but, for convenience, the federal courts 
are assumed to enforce Congress's intent. 
A product safety regulation reflects a tradeoff between safety and prod- 
uct amenities. For example, a very safety conscious agency will require 
bicycles to be quite sturdy, though such strong bikes may have infe- 
rior handling characteristics and lack style. Legislators and the President 
are assumed to know little about particular products. These decisionmak- 
ers, however, have preferences regarding which criteria - safety, handling, 
style - the agency should consider, and also have preferences regarding 
the possible rankings of these criteria. The set of technologically feasible 
product attribute combinations and attribute rankings is denoted X. De- 
note House member z's preferred policy as HteX ( belongs to the set of 
30. The modeling strategy used here and the results in the relevant literature both 
are explained in Hammond and Knott (1996). The analysis omits legislative committees 
but adding them would not change the results. 
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possible combinations and ranks, say, handling first, then style with safety 
last). The conditions on voter preferences set out in Part 2 (complete, con- 
sistent, etc.) imply that the member's utility declines monotonically as the 
House's policy choice moves away from her ideal point //, in any di- 
rection in policy space. Similarly for members of the Senate and for the 
President. 
The "win set" of a particular policy x in the feasible set X is the set 
of policies that majority defeat jc in the relevant legislative body. Denote 
the win set for the House WH{x). The win set necessarily is empty for 
policies that are in the core because no policy can majority defeat a core 
policy. Figure 1 describes the ideal points of a five-member legislature. In 
the Figure, Wh(H3) = <I> because //3 is the only core policy: a move away 
from //3 in any direction in policy space would be vetoed by a majority of 
three legislators.31 In contrast, WH{sq) > 0 because sq - the status quo - 
is outside the core. The safety policy that H3 summarizes would majority 
defeat sq, so the assumed legislature would enact //3. 
3 1 .The symbol <i> denotes the empty set. 
Hl' 
' • sq 
core 
 •  -V  • 
H3 ' h2 HS ' 
' h4 
Figure 1. 
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The President will veto any policy that leaves him worse off than the 
status quo. Consider a policy proposal x. When there is no policy that a 
majority of the House, a majority of the Senate and the President would 
prefer to x, then x is in the House/Senate/President core. Denote this core 
HS P. 
Turning to the problem of policy drift, an administrative agency with 
independent policy preferences will have autonomy if it can choose a 
policy that the legislature could not reverse. Assume that the legislature 
can monitor the agency costlessly.32 Nevertheless, if the HSP core has 
more than one element, the agency may have autonomy. To pursue this 
possibility, let the status quo be no automobile regulation and refer to 
Figure 2. The triangle labeled HSP is the House/Senate/President core. 
The status quo, sq , is not in the core, thus implying that regulation is 
politically feasible. The dark area is the win set for the status quo, which 
is the set of regulatory safety/amenity combinations that Congress and the 
President prefer to no regulation. The dark area is denoted the agency's 
permissible policy set, or PS , because the policies in it are acceptable to 
Congress. Hence, WHSP(sq ) = PSsq. 
An agency with independent preferences and the power to initiate pol- 
icy could enact a regulation that required the safety/amenity combination 
denoted x or the combination that is denoted y. Because x is outside 
the HSP core, it is unstable. The cross-hatched area is the win set for 
x: starting from x, Congress and the President could agree on the set 
of safety/amenity combinations that are in the cross-hatched area. The 
agency could not be reversed, however, if it chose the safety/amenity 
combination denoted y because y is in the HSP core. Recall that no 
policy majority defeats a core policy. This analysis teaches two lessons. 
First, even when an agency chooses a policy that Congress can overrule, 
Congress sometimes cannot restore the policy that the regnant legisla- 
tive coalition originally preferred.33 Second, agency policy choices can be 
irreversible. That Congress sometimes cannot restore its original policy 
32. Agencies can have autonomy when legislative oversight is costly to exercise. 
Lobbyists can facilitate the legislature's oversight role by providing information about 
what he agency is doing. The seminal analysis is McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). A 
more recent treatment is Epstein and O'Halloran (1995). 
33. McNollGast also obtained this result, although in a model with a two- 
dimensional choice problem (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1989). 
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Figure 2. 
choice and sometimes cannot reverse an agency at all is the policy drift 
problem. 
As is becoming recognized, legislatures attempt to constrain adminis- 
trative policy drift. There are four methods. The first is legislative over- 
sight: the legislature monitors the agency's performance, holds hearings 
that are costly for agency members to attend, and through budget con- 
trol rewards compliant behavior and punishes noncompliant behavior. The 
second method of control is to influence agency appointments.34 Third, 
the agency can be required to follow a set of administrative procedures. 
These procedures control who can appear before the agency, how the 
agency must make rules or decide cases, and the like. Controlling pro- 
cedure sometimes can control substance. The final method of control is 
judicial review. The legislature defines the set of core policies from which 
the agency cannot deviate and instructs the appellate courts to constrain 
the agency to the policies in that set. Referring again to Figure 2, a court 
34. McNollGast argues that hese two methods have limited utility (McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast, 1987). 
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that is a faithful agent of Congress will strike any agency policy choice 
that is outside the dark area PSsq.35 
This analysis shows why the typical Congress would be particularly 
concerned with the possibility of state court policy drift. Contrary to the 
assumption above, it is costly for Congress to monitor federal agencies, 
and it may be more costly for it to monitor the state courts. Some jury 
verdicts are opaque; they only award or fail to award money. There also 
are many verdicts and 50 states. On these facts, it likely is difficult for 
Congress to reconstruct the product safety and amenity combinations that 
state law actually is requiring firms to meet. High congressional moni- 
toring costs confer substantial practical autonomy on the state courts to 
regulate products.36 
The more serious problem was just developed: state tort law could re- 
quire firms to produce safety and amenity combinations uch that: (1) 
Congress could overrule the state courts but could not reenact any of the 
safety/amenity combinations that are in the permissible set PSsq' or (2) 
Congress could not affect a state induced result at all because the result 
requires afety/amenity combinations that are in the HSP core but outside 
the permissible set. In either event, a Congress that understood what ju- 
ries were doing would have its will frustrated. Congress also cannot use 
the indirect methods of control to deter state court policy drift. Congress 
cannot influence state court appointments, procedures, or budgets, and 
the federal appellate courts do not review state tort law judgments. That 
Congress cannot exert indirect control over the state courts, as it can over 
federal agencies, implies that a Congressional preference exists for the 
state courts to use the interpretative strategy urged here: these courts, that 
35.Mashaw, supra note 14, remarked (at 193) that judicial review should func- 
tion in this way: . . from a normative perspective, the external environment of rule 
making should be structured to force administrative policy within the half lens [the 
PS set in Figure 2]. That is the democratically pproved bargain embodied in the 
legislation . . . Judicial review . . . should have the same purpose." Similarly, Sunstein, 
supra note 7, observes (at 149) that delegations to agencies "have been allowed largely 
on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to what- 
ever statutory directives have been issued." Congress's problem respecting policy drift 
is more complex when the federal courts have policy preferences of their own. Inter- 
esting analyses are Spiller and Tiller (1997) and Ferejohn a d Weingast (1992). 
36. This difficulty may be partly mitigated by"fire alarm" oversight: affected inter- 
ests have an incentive totell Congress what he states are doing (see authorities cited 
supra note 32 and also Lupia and McCubbins, 1994.) 
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is, should interpret statutes in ways that facilitate the ability of Congress to 
correct interpretative errors. Part 4.2 shows how this general interpretative 
strategy applies to the regulatory compliance defense.37 
4.2. Controlling Policy Drift 
It is harder for Congress to correct an erroneous judicial interpretation 
that it intended to enact a minimum safety standard than it is for Congress 
to correct an erroneous judicial interpretation that it intended to enact a 
national standard. To see why, realize first hat Congress legislates against 
a background of state tort law. The effect of a new safety statute on a firm's 
behavior thus requires an initial analysis of how unmodified state law 
influences the firm's safety decisions. Part 4.2 begins with this analysis, 
then shows how a federal minimum or national safety standard affects 
the amount of safety firms will produce, and last shows how one type of 
judicial error is easier for Congress to correct han the other. 
Products Liability law alone applies in the no regulation world. Denote 
as X a particular safety level that a firm may produce. This safety level 
will affect wo probabilities. The first is the probability that an accident 
will occur, which is called p{x). If the firm is held liable for an accident, 
it will expect to pay damages of some amount dj(x ), where J indexes 
all possible juries and dj is the award that jury j will make. Thus, the 
expected value of a successful judgment against a firm that is sued and 
loses is j(x) = p{ x) • dj(x). The second relevant probability concerns 
whether a firm that is sued will actually be found liable. Current law 
holds that a product is defectively designed if it creates risks in excess 
of the benefits it yields. This is a negligence test, and there is commonly 
37. As the Introduction ndicated, the state courts would apply this strategy b  
treating federal statutes orregulations as national standards. If a regulation is at issue, 
however, there is a prior question whether the regulation itself is in the permissible 
set or reflects policy drift. If the latter, should the state courts apply a standard that 
Congress itself would not want? There are two answers to this question. First, when 
Congress has given sufficient direction to federal appellate courts to enable these courts 
to confine agencies to the permissible set, the state courts, on the arguments to be made 
below, should act as would a federal appellate court. That is, they should apply the 
safety standard that Congress prefers. Second, when the PS set is difficult for any court 
to determine, so that courts are unsure whether the agency drifted, both federal nd 
state courts should apply the regulation the agency chose. This is because Congress 
is better equipped than the courts to detect deviations and to use indirect methods of 
control to deter them. 
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uncertainty as to how particular juries will apply a negligence test. In an 
uncertain world, the amount of safety the firm chose - the level of x - will 
affect he likelihood that a jury will find it liable, but will not conclusively 
determine that likelihood. Consequently, the firm will predict the second 
probability by estimating the mean level of safety that the legal system 
likely will require it to meet, and the variance around that mean. Denote 
a j(x) as the probability that a jury will hold the firm liable given the 
level of safety it chose.38 It also is costly for the firm to produce safety. 
If c(x ) is the cost to the firm of producing safety level x, then the firm's 
total expected safety costs are E(S) = c(x) + taj(x)j(x). The firm will 
choose the x - the safety level - that minimizes E(S ), its expected safety 
cost. 
Such a firm may produce more safety than the mean of the safety 
distribution - the average level of safety the legal system requires - or less. 
To see what the firm will do, realize that uncertainty as to the jury stan- 
dard that will actually be applied has two possibly offsetting effects. The 
first effect of uncertainty is to induce the firm to undercomply with the 
expected jury standard. There is a positive probability that the standard 
the jury in an actual case would choose would be lower. The larger the 
uncertainty (in technical terms, the greater the variance) around the mean 
jury standard, the smaller the probability that a noncomplying firm will 
be held liable. On the other hand, if a jury's application of the risk ben- 
efit test is partly a function of how much safety the firm produced, and 
there is relatively little uncertainty in application of the standard, then 
the firm has an incentive to overcomply. To illustrate, let the expected 
jury standard require a platform to hold 120 kg of weight and suppose 
that the probability of being held liable falls sharply as the firm increases 
platform strength above 120 kg. Then the firm might make the platform 
38. For technical readers, let ¿(jc) be the firm's probability distribution around the 
legal standard. Assume that /(*) is a continuous probability density with support [0, oo]. 
Then the probability that he firm's precaution level jc will be found below the legal 
standard ofcare is 
/rmax t(x)d(x). 
As jt increases - the firm produces more safety - the value of the integrand declines: 
the firm will assign a lower value to the probability of being held liable. The analysis 
here ignores the possibility that an accident victim also will be negligent. Considering 
this possibility would not affect the conclusions. 
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hold more than 120 kg. At 120 kg, the marginal reduction in the firm's 
expected accident cost (due to the marginal reduction in the probability 
of being held liable) would exceed the marginal cost of producing more 
safety. 
The second factor affecting what safety level the firm will produce is 
the marginal cost of producing safety around the expected jury standard. 
If adding 5 kg of strength to the platform is very expensive, then even 
a large decrease in the probability of liability may not justify the added 
safety expense. But if the marginal cost of producing more safety than 
the mean expected jury standard requires is relatively low, the firm likely 
will overcomply with the standard. This is because the marginal cost of 
safety would be lower than the marginal reduction in the firm's expected 
liability cost in the neighborhood of the standard. 
A firm is unlikely to produce safety at either extreme point. The min- 
imum such point would require a safety level of zero: the product is 
maximally unsafe. A firm would produce the lowest safety level only if 
uncertainty respecting application of the jury standard is very great (so 
that there is a great gain to undercomplying by the maximum amount) or 
if the marginal cost of producing more safety than the minimum requires 
is very large (so that there is a great cost to producing any safety at all). 
In the usual case, firms will produce more safety than the minimum that 
a jury might possibly permit. The other extreme point would require the 
firm to produce so much safety that any more would alter the character 
of the product. A car would become a tank. The marginal cost of produc- 
ing this much safety would likely swamp the marginal reduction in the 
expected value of being held liable in tort. 
Now consider Congress (or an agency) that is choosing a safety regula- 
tion that it expects the courts to interpret correctly. Congress could choose 
a minimum standard, denoted xmin, or a national standard. A Congress that 
wanted to set a floor would not approve a safety standard that equaled the 
technologically feasible maximum, xmax: for then, all firms would pro- 
duce the safety level xmax. Picking the highest feasible standard is in- 
consistent with an intention to set a floor. A statute (or regulation) that 
set ^min < Xmax would have three effects: (1) no firm would produce less 
safety than xmin; (2) all firms would produce more safety than they had 
been producing before the legal change; and (3) firms could choose among 
designs that embodied the minimum amount of safety or more. 
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The second effect requires more discussion. That the federal govern- 
ment selected a product for national regulation likely will induce a court 
or jury to suppose that the product is more dangerous than would be 
thought had there been no regulation. A firm that anticipates this reason- 
ing will itself reason that the probability of being held liable at any par- 
ticular safety level x has increased. Returning to the equations introduced 
above, if the firm's new probability of being held liable is tfy(min)(*), 
then > üj{x). The firm's new problem will be to choose that 
x - the safety level - that minimizes E(Smin) = c(x) + Stf7(min) (*)./(*)• 
Notice that E(Sm[n ) > E(S ): the expected cost of safety to the firm if 
it produces a particular safety level x is higher after Congress requires a 
minimum level of safety than before, because the firm's probability of be- 
ing held liable if it produces safety level x is higher. In consequence, the 
marginal gain to the firm as it begins to increase the safety level above 
x will be positive. The higher the minimum level of safety a statute or 
regulation requires, the more safety the firm will be induced to produce.39 
A Congress that intends to require only a minimum level of safety 
thus intends to produce the three effects noted above: no firms below the 
minimum, an increase in the general safety level, and firms with discre- 
tion to choose the safety/amenity mix. A Congress that intends to enact 
a national standard also wants firms not to produce less safety than the 
standard requires. This Congress, however, knows that it has withdrawn 
considerable discretion from firms for two reasons. First, a national stan- 
39. Again for technical readers, passing a minimum safety standard truncates the 
distribution of safety levels that a jury could permit at the lower end (because the 
firm is liable with certainly if it produces less safety than the statutory minimum). 
As a result, probability mass is transferred to the part of the distribution above the 
minimum, increasing the likelihood that he firm will be held liable for any safety level 
jc that he firm produces. For a firm with convex costs, when the first order condition 
for E(Smin) is differentiated totally with respect to the regulatory safety level xmin, then 
unsurprisingly the result is
^>0. 
dxmm 
As the minimum regulatory safety level jcmin creases, the firm will produce more 
safety. Although t ere islittle direct evidence for this result, ithas recently been shown, 
in the FDA context, that increased Congressional oversight of agencies increases reg- 
ulatory compliance by firms. The oversight is taken as a signal of possible increased 
agency enforcement activity or more rulemaking (see Olson, 1999). When an agency 
actually adopts a new safety rule, this may signal to firms possible increased nforce- 
ment activity by it and by private parties. 
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dard will require more safety than the minimum, thereby shrinking the 
set of safety/amenity combinations that a firm can produce. Second, a 
court that enforces the national standard will exculpate firms that meet 
it from liability. A firm thus could not reduce its probability of being 
held liable by producing more safety than the law requires. These rea- 
sons suggest that firms likely will produce safety/amenity combinations 
that are in the neighborhood of the safety level in the statute or regu- 
lation. Because Congress can anticipate this, it is safe to suppose that 
a House/Senate/President majority existed for the regulatory safety level 
that was enacted. On the information given here, however, it is not certain 
that the enacted choice could majority defeat every other technologically 
feasible safety level that Congress could have required firms to satisfy. 
Turn next to the possibility of judicial error. A court can make either 
of two mistakes: to interpret a national standard as a minimum, or to 
interpret a minimum standard as national. In analyzing these errors, it 
will be helpful to denote the set of core points differently than in the 
model of Part 4.1. 
The vertical axis in Figure 3 represents the safety level for a prod- 
uct; the horizontal axis represents the amenity level. The Figure assumes 
that the core is not a singleton: that is, there is a set of safety/amenity 
combinations for Congress and the President none of which can major- 
ity defeat the others. The curve N in Figure 3 represents a set of possible 
core points. 
Begin with the error of treating a national standard as a minimum and 
let a statute direct the federal agency to enact regulations that reflect he 
safety/amenity combination denoted b. If courts treat his regulatory level 
as a minimum, then unless Congress set the level at the technological max- 
imum (xmax in the analysis above), firms will produce more safety than 
they had been producing. Points a, c, and d reflect possible safety/amenity 
combinations that state law could induce firms to produce: all of these re- 
quire more safety than the statutory point b does. Congress could reverse 
the combinations that c and d reflect but could not reverse any combina- 
tion on the curve N, such as point a ; for all points on the curve above 
b also are in the core. Figure 3 thus illustrates the likely fact that the 
set of safety/amenity combinations that Congress can pass will not nec- 
essarily majority defeat all of the safety /amenity combinations that state 
courts could induce firms to produce, when the state induced combina- 
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tions require more safety than Congress did. As a consequence, Congress 
sometimes cannot correct erroneous tate court statutory interpretations 
that take Congress to want a minimum standard when Congress actually 
wanted a national standard. 
Next consider the judicial error of finding that Congress wanted a 
national standard when it wanted only a floor. A state court that read 
Congress as setting a national standard would defer to that standard: it 
would hold firms liable that did not meet it and exculpate firms that did. 
If point b in Figure 4 reflects the safety/amenity combination in the statute 
(or regulation), courts will hold firms to point b. It was shown above that 
when Congress knowingly enacts a minimum, it intends to increase the 
average safety level above that minimum and to give firms discretion to 
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choose safety/amenity combinations. The SA curve in Figure 4 reflects a
possible set of safety/amenity combinations that Congress would expect 
the statutory minimum reflected in point b to induce (if courts correctly 
interpret the statute to require only a minimum). The part of the SA curve 
between e and / describes the set of safety/amenity combinations that 
would majority defeat point b if Congress were choosing a national rather 
than a minimum standard. 
This analysis has an important implication: when Congress wants state 
courts to treat safety regulations as minima, the win set for a point such 
as b seldom will be empty. That is, there very likely will be at least one 
safety/amenity combination that the national government could pass that 
would require more safety than the safety/amenity combination that the 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
36 American Law and Economics Review V2 N1 2000 (1-57) 
State courts are requiring firms to produce, when the state courts wrongly 
find that Congress intended to enact a binding national standard. Again, 
this result obtains because a Congress that wants to enact a minimum 
expects to induce firms to produce more safety than the minimum. There- 
fore, when the state courts wrongly hold that a national standard was 
meant, Congress either will amend the statute to make clear to the state 
courts that only a minimum was intended or it will raise the statutory 
minimum. Since Congress cannot deter state law interpretative mistakes 
with indirect methods of control, such as budgetary pressure, this "risk 
of error" analysis implies that Congress prefers the state courts to in- 
terpret federal safety regulations to set national rather than minimum 
standards.40 
Finally, it may be observed that Congress can reverse noncore policies, 
so that state court interventions will not produce policies that lie outside 
40. Congress sometime uses a third rule called a "safe harbor." This rule will excul- 
pate firms that comply, but does not necessarily hold firms liable that do not; rather, the 
behavior fnoncompliant firms i adjudicated case by case. The interpretative rule that 
courts now use, which assumes that Congress intended a minimum standard, would 
entirely vitiate a safe harbor rule were one intended, for the current rule holds liable 
all noncompliant firms and some compliants firms, thereby strongly overdeterring the 
relevant behavior. Assuming that Congress intended a national standard preserves the 
feature of the safe harbor rule that exculpates compliant firms, but also overdeters be- 
cause it automatically holds liable some firms that acase-by-case inquiry would excuse. 
In fact, if Congress could choose any of the three rule types, a judicial assumption that 
Congress meant o choose a safe harbor might be best. This interpretative strategy 
would not strongly overdeter and will produce less safety than either a national or a 
minimum standard. Asshown above, it is easier for Congress to correct mistaken i ter- 
pretations that suppose it to want oo little safety than to want oo much. State courts 
should not resolve uncertain cases by taking Congress to have enacted a safe harbor, 
however, because Congress seems not to use this rule in the safety area. 
The argument i  text implicitly assumes that Congress lacks rational expectations. 
To justify this assumption, realize first that if B will raise any standard that A enacts, 
then A will enact a standard that is below its ideal point. A could be regarded as the 
Congress, but here are 50 Bs - the state courts - and each of them could choose a dif- 
ferent safety level. Also, the level that is chosen in a law suit can be a function fthe 
particular facts. Thus, unlike in the two-person case, Congress could not easily predict 
the state courts' responses to its statutes. Consequently, Congress would have difficulty 
gaming against the state courts and would prefer to enact its ideal point and have it 
respected. 
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the maximal set. This may suggest that the current interpretative rules are 
normatively defensible. The suggestion should be resisted because Con- 
gressional procedures determine which core points are enacted as statutes. 
The procedures, in turn, are designed to enable Congress to implement 
its substantive preferences over a range of areas through time; that is, the 
procedures help to ensure that Congress will enact a certain set of laws 
in general and not other laws. As an illustration, a recent study of how 
various Congresses voted on the question whether the Senate should re- 
tain its unlimited ebate rule concluded: "The overwhelming importance 
of the policy positions of senators in voting for reform suggest that, on 
the whole, senators' views about the [procedural] rules are determined 
by the implications of those rules for the policy choices of the Senate" 
(Binder and Smith, 1998). Hence, an interpretative rule that directs the 
state courts not to search for legislative intent but rather to choose the 
policy they prefer because the final outcome will be in the core would de- 
prive the national government of much control over the setting of policy 
generally.41 
5. Capture 
The argument in Parts 3 and 4 supposed Congress to be pursuing a 
public purpose. The current preemption rule, however, is partly justified 
by a contrary assumption, that Congress commonly is captured by private 
interests. Part 5 will claim that courts should not use the capture concept 
as a justification for altering federal safety regulations. 
The analysis will focus on possible capture of the Congress because 
Congress creates the regulatory criteria that govern the agencies, and also 
because Congress sometimes can reverse an agency action and otherwise 
41. A minority of federal statutes that do not discuss tort law sometimes explicitly 
will recite that he states' common law may continue to function i the field. An 
allocation of authority under which the power to set safety standards is delegated to 
an administrative agency and the power to adjudicate compensation is delegated to a 
court best uses the relative expertise of the two institutions. I  light of the arguments 
in this article, then, statutory eferences to the common law are best taken as making 
clear that courts are not preempted institutionally from using tort remedies tosanction 
statutory violations. 
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exert indirect control over agencies.42 A capture claim can be made in a 
weak or a strong form. The weak form applies to the regulation of a single 
product. It holds that there is a normatively desirable safety level that the 
product should meet. In consequence of political failure, Congress per- 
mitted an agency to allow firms to fall below this safety level. Therefore, 
regulations that the agency enacts probably will require too little safety. A 
court in a products liability suit thus is justified in treating the regulatory 
safety level as a floor that state tort law is free to raise.43 The strong form 
of a capture claim holds that the political failure affecting the regulation 
of the particular product is general. It is the strong form of the capture 
claim that partly sustains the current interpretative rule; the courts treat 
all regulatory levels as floors. Both forms of the capture claim are in the 
42. In addition to the ability of Congress to affect agency output, there is an un- 
resolved dispute in the literature regarding whether Congress is easier to capture than 
federal agencies are. One the one hand, it is legal to give legislators money (campaign 
contributions) but it is not legal to give agency personnel money. This implies that 
lobbying before agencies will only be informational (thelobbyist provides informa- 
tion and attempts to persuade). Congress thus eems easier to capture than an agency. 
On the other hand, agency decisions generally have less visibility than legislative deci- 
sions. Thus, it may be easier to bring whatever influence aninterest group has to bear 
on an agency. This implies that agencies are easier to affect. Given this uncertainty, lit- 
tle generality seemingly is lost by analyzing the possible capture of only one of these 
institutions. 
43.Ausness, supra note 1, puts this claim well (p. 1238): "Tort liability 
offsets . . .flaws in the regulatory process by encouraging manufacturers to exceed fed- 
eral safety regulations when it is cost effective to do. This incentive will be foreclosed 
if state tort claims are preempted byagency action." Aefficiency based capture claim 
may founder over the difficulties discussed in Part 3.1: the state courts have difficulty 
identifying the efficient safety level. In addition, the likelihood fcapture is negatively 
related to the heterogeneity of the regulatee universe. A single industry will have less 
difficulty coordinating o  a strategy to influence regulation than anumber ofindustries 
will have. Hence, Congress or an agency has more freedom topursue the public inter- 
est when regulating a diverse group of firms. Inaddition, there is substantial evidence 
that Congress overregulates as well as underregulates (see Frailberg and Trebilcock, 
1998). This evidence together with firm diversity calls into question the monism of 
current tort law, which supposes that business generated capture is equally likely for 
all safety regulations. Finally, state courts and agencies also can be captured. A com- 
plete defense of the capture justification that helps upport current law thus would be 
comparative, showing that state legal institutions are less subject to capture than federal 
institutions. This showing has not been made. Part 5 focuses on more basic problems 
with the capture concept than the concerns raised in this note. 
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genre of arguments that statutory interpretation should attempt to redeem 
defects in the political process.44 
These arguments resonate because organized groups commonly affect 
political outcomes. The task for a court doing statutory interpretation, 
however, is to distinguish between statutes or regulations that are a prod- 
uct of the usual political processes and those that were the product of 
inappropriate pressures. Only the latter require interpretation to improve 
the law. Part 5 will argue that political processes are not well enough un- 
derstood to permit courts to draw the requisite distinctions when acting 
on the weak form of the capture objection (which evaluates capture case 
by case). If this is so, the strong form also is nonjusticiable. 
5.1. The Capture Concept 
Capture claims should be analyzed similarly to preemption claims, in 
the sense that a useful capture discussion cannot get off the ground unless 
the discussants first agree on the substantive goal that the relevant legal 
institution is supposed to pursue. This is because an institution is "cap- 
tured" when it is prevented from doing what it would do in a better world. 
44. Eskridge, supra note 6 (at 159), is illustrative: 
A related ysfunction is Congress's tendency to delegate policy decisions to agencies, 
which might then be "captured" over time by regulated groups or other interests.87 
Agency capture happens when the regulated group is significantly better o ganized than 
beneficiaries who are widely distributed hroughout the polity and whose diffusion a d 
numbers make them less likely to organize politically  Statutory interpretation can 
operate (at least at the margins) to keep the implementation process open to critical 
perspectives and even to represent the voice of forgotten beneficiaries. 
In a similar vein, Färber and Frickey, supra note 7 (at 1 16), say, "The goal [of reform- 
minded courts] would be to tip the legislative process towarrd i eology and structure - 
and thus, toward legislative ability to formulate public policy - and away from legisla- 
tive capture by special interests and incoherence." Seealso Gillette and Krier (1990): 
". . . the problem of asymmetric access [because of differential co ition costs] suggests 
that agency decisions would tend in the direction fproducer interests, and thus toward 
too much public risk [imposed on citizens]." A criticism ofusing statutory interpreta- 
tion to ameliorate political process defects i Elhauge (1991, p. 31). 
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For example, if Congress should require agencies to create efficient safety 
regulations, then Congress is not captured unless the political process has 
caused it to permit agencies to create inefficient safety regulations.45 Fol- 
lowing the practice in Parts 3 and 4, this part assumes that a Congress free 
from invidious political pressures would want optimal safety regulations.46 
Realizing that a capture claim necessarily presupposes a substantive 
norm exposes two difficulties. The first difficulty runs to relevance. If the 
enacting Congress would ideally have pursued efficiency, there apparently 
is no need for a court to ask whether process defects infected a partic- 
ular regulation: the court instead could enforce the regulation if it was 
efficient and ignore it otherwise.47 The relevance difficulty is not conclu- 
sive, however, because outcomes can be hard to evaluate directly. In the 
area of economic regulation, it thus is customary to focus on factors that 
correlate negatively with efficiency. As an illustration, itis enough in an- 
titrust law to show the existence of a cartel; the court need not evaluate the 
prices that the cartel charges. Similarly, it may be enough here to show the 
existence of invidious political factors that prevented the Congress from 
pursuing a desirable goal. 
This raises the second difficulty with the capture concept, that of cau- 
sation. Suppose that Congress intended to enact a national safety standard. 
That the statute was passed under the legally prescribed procedures entitles 
it to some presumptive weight; it is the law. Also, the statute was passed by 
a democratic majority and signed by a democratically elected President. 
A state court that feels free to vary the statute because a higher safety 
standard seems best to it thus encounters both federalism and counter- 
majoritarian difficulties. These difficulties would be avoided if (1) the 
45. This insight is not original but is often ignored. See Levine (1998): "Calling a 
regulator 'captured' usually implies taking positions on intellectual choices of which 
the user is unaware"; Elhauge, id. p. 49: "condemning the political process because of 
interest group influence is indistinguishable from condemning the political process for 
producing outcomes the condemnor dislikes on independent normative grounds." See 
also id, pp. 48, 60. 
46. As will appear, the same points could be made if Congress had redistributional 
or other normative objectives. 
47. Elhauge (1991) apparently believes that decision makers should apply substan- 
tive norms directly to statutes rather than evaluate statutes by the indirect means of 
assessing process defects. 
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state courts withdraw presumptive l gitimacy only from safety statutes 
that were passed on account of invidious political factors, and (2) these 
courts implement the result hat Congress would have enacted had the in- 
vidious factors been absent.48 To satisfy these inquiries requires a causal 
theory, but no such theory is apparent. This is the causation difficulty. 
5.2. An Analysis of the Causation Difficulty 
Begin with the usual capture story, which focuses on the relative abil- 
ity of groups to influence the legislature. This focus creates a ubiquity 
concern. Political markets are said to fail in consequence of concentrated 
costs and diffuse benefits or concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. In 
this story, when a proposed regulation would impose costs on a cohesive 
group, the group perhaps could subvert he regulatory scheme. When reg- 
ulation would create benefits for a cohesive group, the group may cause 
the regulation to be passed in a form that gives them disproportionate 
gains. The ubiquity concern is that Congress seldom passes laws without 
the support of cohesive, politically influential groups. Also, many of the 
people who may be adversely affected by a statute often play no role in 
its adoption.49 Thus, almost every federal statute is the product of capture 
in the concentrated costs/concentrated b nefits sense. It cannot follow that 
the state courts are entitled to withdraw presumptive l gitimacy from all 
of them because a capture theory is supposed to tell the courts how to 
distinguish good laws from bad ones.50 Therefore, the search must be for 
more particular causal factors. 
48. An analogous need apparently exists in other areas. See Kreimer (1984): "In 
order to infer [for purposes of judicial review] that a decision was tainted by an imper- 
missible purpose, the court must determine what he government would have done in 
the absence of that purpose. But in order to make that determination, the courts must 
have a model of the way that a proper government would function." 
49. Mashaw has remarked that "all potential groups do not form, and those that do 
have significant power in the legislative process" (supra note 14, pp. 55-56). 
50. This point has been made before. In analyzing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1908), which upheld a statute hat set maximum hours women could work in facto- 
ries and laundries, Mark Tushnet remarked: 
In the real world of politics, the statute inMuller was the product of a complex alliance 
among labor unions, ocial workers, ideologues, and the like  If an augmented [con- 
stitutional] theory allowed this ort of alliance to qualify as a systematic distortion of 
the political process, it is hard to see what would not count. Constitutional theory must 
resist hat conclusion. (Tushnet, 1988; see also Spitzer, 1988) 
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Figure 5. 
The model of automobile safety regulation analyzed in Part 4.1 is used 
here to explain how difficult this search is. Assume that today the Senate 
ranks automobile safety first, the House prefers high-performance cars, 
and the President is concerned with fuel economy. An HSP core with 
these preferences is illustrated in Figure 5. The core point sq represents 
the current, stable regulatory standard. The standard will produce safe cars 
that are not very fuel efficient and not much fun to drive. 
Assume next that this is an election year for the Congress but not 
the President and a number of Senators are facing difficult races. The 
automobile industry and the United Auto Workers make contributions to
The theory of statutory interpretation thus hould resist the idea that political cohesive- 
ness alone renders political outputs suspect; for on this view, that a proposal passes 
would be a sufficient ground for suspecting the proposal. 
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these Senators and lobby them about excessive regulation. The lobbyists 
claim that consumers dislike current cars and that a less exclusive focus on 
safety will make everyone happier. After the election, the new Senate's 
preferences regarding regulation change to the point represented by Sf :
this Senate has come to value safety less and performance more. The 
new core is HS' P. In consequence, the relevant statute is amended to 
require the new regulatory standard summarized by point x. Note that 
point X represents an improvement for the President and the House, whose 
preferences did not change. 
In the example, a new statute was passed that will reduce automobile 
safety. The jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for the statutory 
change to x were that the Senate's preferences changed, the House's pref- 
erences remained the same, and the President's preferences remained the 
same. It is difficult to go further than this. Neither the House nor the 
President were lobbied in this story. Did the statute pass because key Sen- 
ators were lobbied or because the President and House appropriately held 
unchanged beliefs? 
A capture theory apparently should answer these questions. A Sena- 
tor accused of selling out to business interests can claim with apparent 
plausibility that the new statute was passed "because" the President was 
powerful and preferred fuel efficient cars to safe ones at the margin and 
also "because" the House was more willing than it to sacrifice safety to 
handling quality. It is difficult convincingly to say that the statute passed 
"because" lobbyists captured the Senate if one cannot convincingly say 
that the Senate's preference change caused the new law. 
One may attempt to avoid this problem by focusing less on changes 
in the preferences of legislators and more on how those changes were 
induced. Thus, in the example a change in the Senate's preferences was a 
necessary condition of a move to less safe regulation, and the preference 
change was induced by lobbying and campaign contributions. Focusing 
on how political change was produced is to treat cause functionally. A 
functional theory of causation attaches the label "the cause" to one of 
the necessary conditions of an event in order to bring about or to deter 
particular states of affairs. For an analogy, the economic theory of torts 
attributes "the cause" of an accident to the cheapest cost avoider in order 
to impose liability on the class of actors that can most efficiently reduce 
accident costs. Similarly, a capture theory could attribute "the cause" of 
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passage of the new statute in the example here to lobbying of the Senate 
if (1) the lobbying induced some Senators to alter their preferences, (2) 
the preference change was a necessary condition of the statute's passage, 
and (3) deterring the lobbying of Senators regarding safety would produce 
more efficient safety regulation. 
The last step is problematic: as far as is known, the correlation be- 
tween lobbying and inefficient legislative outputs is much weaker than 
the correlation between, say, monopoly power and noncompetitive prices. 
Lobbyists sometimes provide legislators with useful information about the 
consequences of proposed laws. Lobbyists also sometimes erve the cause 
of efficiency, as when they oppose inefficient regulations that are meant to 
protect particular industries. Therefore, in the example here, if Congress 
should pursue efficiency, then a lobbying induced legal change would be 
"the cause" of that change only in circumstances when lobbying is likely 
to be a necessary (or predisposing) cause of inefficient safety laws gen- 
erally. At present, criteria that would permit courts to identify these cir- 
cumstances do not exist. A consequence of this gap is that capture claims 
cannot be evaluated with functional theories of causation. 
Turn next to the second requirement for justifying judicial causation 
inquiries - implementing what the legislature would have enacted had no 
invidious causes been present. In the example here, if lobbying the Senate 
was an invidious cause of the new statute, then had that cause been absent, 
the status quo regulation - point sq - would have obtained. This result 
would not satisfy the second requirement, however, because sq itself may 
have been the product of prior invidious political factors. To avoid this 
possibility, a court apparently must start from scratch and ask what the 
Congress would have done under ideal conditions. 
This question is similar to the task that Michael Levine set for those 
claiming that capture had occurred, which was to compare actual politi- 
cal outcomes to the outcomes that a polity free from (political) transac- 
tions costs would have generated (Levine and Forrance, 1990). This way 
of putting the issue cannot avoid the causation difficulty. Initially, it is 
difficult to tell when a political practice is a transaction cost or a use- 
ful input. For example, if an interest group has low coalition costs, it 
can organize to influence votes independently of the merits or to tell an 
efficiency story to legislators. Both of these activities may require cam- 
paign contributions - to influence the vote itself or to get a busy legislator 
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to hear the message. The ability to raise money efficiently, like lobby- 
ing in the model here, can produce suboptimal outcomes (then political 
cohesiveness is a cost) or optimal outcomes (then political cohesiveness 
is a gain). Knowing when low coalition costs are more likely than not 
to yield inefficiency requires more theory than now exists. Further, it is 
difficult to know what a polity free from transaction costs would have 
done.51 
Finally, a theory of causation sometimes used by historians attributes 
the "cause" of an unusual event to the least typical necessary cause of that 
event. Thus, it was the largest rainfall in ten years that caused flooding 
losses rather than the penchant of people to build in flood plains. This 
theory of causation cannot help with capture issues. In the example above, 
even if the new safety statute could be described as unusual, lobbying 
legislators is normal business. 
Lobbying and campaign contributions commonly are necessary con- 
ditions for statutory change. Nothing said here should be taken to deny 
that these changes sometimes are for the worse. It is appropriate, there- 
fore, for Congress to regulate the practices that are used to influence 
it, and Congress occasionally has done so. Thus, lobbyists must reg- 
ister, disclose their employers, and so forth. The state courts cannot 
regulate attempts to influence the national legislature, however. Rather, 
these courts need, but lack, a causation theory that would permit them to 
5 1 .The text discusses the political transaction costs that are usually mentioned in 
capture discussions, such as lobbying and giving politicians money. A different ca - 
egory of political transaction costs exists that can prevent democratic polities from 
implementing efficient policies. For example, politicians find it difficult to make cred- 
ible long-term commitments to deals under which it is efficient to compensate the 
losers from an efficient policy. As a consequence, if the losers will not be fully paid 
off early, they may block the policy. A technical analysis of this and related problems 
is Besley and Coate (1998). A good nontechnical survey of the political transaction 
costs that make the implementation of efficient policies difficult is Dixit (1996). Politi- 
cal transaction c sts uch as these seem irrelevant to he capture issues discussed here. 
As an illustration, thedifficulty politicians face in committing credibly to deals that 
would extend through time may lessen the likelihood that efficient safety regulations 
will be passed but does not imply that any inefficiencies willsystematically benefit 
producers. 
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know when they should use statutory interpretation to improve legislative 
products.52 
To summarize, the weak form of the capture claim that partly sustains 
current law holds that when Congress enacts a bad law because of defects 
in the political process, the state courts should not defer fully to that law. 
This claim founders over two difficulties: courts cannot tell when bad po- 
litical practices caused bad laws, and courts cannot know what laws would 
have been passed had the bad political practices been absent.53 Perhaps 
for these reasons, capture is not an issue in actual products liability cases. 
Rather, the state courts tacitly and the ALI explicitly have assumed that 
"capture" is ubiquitous - the strong form of the capture objection. Partly 
as a consequence, state law treats all federal regulations as presumptive 
floors. The strong form of the capture objection must fall with the weak 
form, however. To say that capture always exists, although it can never be 
identified, is too hard a position to defend.54 
52. Interest groups apparently have a theory of causation because they give money 
to political actors. There is a question, however, whether money is given to influence 
elections or votes on statutes. Ifthe former, then it is hard to say that a particular 
statute was caused by capture. The debate is summarized in Stratmann (1998) (arguing, 
with data from farm support votes, that when only a single cohesive interest group is 
present it tries to influence both elections and votes). An interest group's theory of 
causation also should not be the law's theory. One reason for this view is that an 
interest group may give money to a congressperson whose constituents support the 
desired legislation - price supports in a farm state - because such a legislator is less 
likely to renege on a promise to vote as the group desires. The contribution is meant 
to prevent the legislator f om going against her constituent's (and the interest group's) 
preferences. A legislator who votes as her constituents want apparently is not captured 
by an interest group. More importantly, it may be enough for an interest group to make 
itself a necessary condition fstatutory change. On the argument above, however, state 
courts must identify sufficient conditions. 
53. The discussion i text used the efficiency norm, but the same results would 
obtain if the word equity was substituted forefficiency in every sentence. The general 
problem is the inability to link political practices causally to political outcomes. 
54. Levine, supra note 45, believes, with reference toagencies, that "It is only 
meaningful to talk about 'capture' if the regulator decides in a self-regarding way
to use the shelter from political risk created by imperfect monitoring ... to adopt a 
policy favored by a beneficiary (t pically an organized subgroup of the polity) from 
which she expects to benefit personally (in political support, future employment, or 
direct bribery)." Levine would also apply this definition to Congress. Since legislators 
commonly do things for political support, focusing on this criterion would recreate he 
difficulties noted above. Limiting the definition of capture to cases of overt or thinly 
concealed pursuit of personal, nonpolitical g in seems ound, however. 
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6. Conclusion 
Products liability law contains a doctrine of partial substantive pre- 
emption: the courts treat noncompliance with a federal safety statute or 
regulation as negligence per se, and treat compliance only as evidence 
that a jury can consider in deciding whether a firm made a defective 
product. Congress can decide what weight in tort suits federal regula- 
tions should have, but the state courts need a rule of interpretation when 
a federal safety statute is unclear (as commonly happens). The current 
rule assumes that Congress intends always to enact regulatory floors. This 
article has argued for a different rule of interpretation, which would re- 
quire courts to take statutes to enact full substantive preemption unless 
reasons existed that could have persuaded a public regarding Congress 
to supplement federal regulation with state tort law. This interpretative 
rule attributes to Congress, in the general case, the intention to require 
firms that violate regulations to be held liable but to exculpate firms that 
comply. The proposed rule follows from two constructions of legislative 
intent: Congress would prefer the typical safety regulation to be nationally 
uniform, and Congress would prefer state courts to read federal aws in 
ways that maximize the ability of the national government to correct in- 
terpretative mistakes. For reasons given above, it is easier for Congress to 
correct state court interpretations that suppose Congress to want too much 
safety than interpretations that suppose it to want too little. Defenses of 
the current rule of interpretation, that Congress and its agencies tend to 
be captured by private interests or that the state courts can usefully sup- 
plement efficiency seeking federal regulatory schemes, are unpersuasive. 
Capture theory is insufficiently advanced to permit courts to make reli- 
able capture determinations. And courts and juries seldom could improve 
federal safety regulations. 
Whether these arguments fully persuade, it is clear that the state courts 
created, and the ALI recently endorsed, the current regulatory compliance 
defense with little serious consideration of the statutory interpretation, 
federalism, and institutional competence issues discussed here.55 A well- 
55. The ALI's failure to focus on these issues was not accidental. These issues are 
relevant toconsideration of how the law could be improved. Throughout the Products 
Liability restatement process and after, plaintiffs' lawyers accused the ALI of engag- 
ing in "law reform." One of the two reporters for the Products Liability Restatement, 
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grounded justification of the defense would take the broader issues into 
account. Doing this suggests a final thought. An important part of state 
tort law may lack political legitimacy, in the sense that the law ignores 
what seems the likely Congressional will. 
Appendix 
Preemption Provisions of Selected Federal Statutes 
Federal Insecticide , Fungicide , and Rodenticide Act. 1 U.S.C. A. §136v 
(1997). In general, a state may regulate the sale and use of pesticides or 
devices covered by the act, although the state may not permit any sale 
or use prohibited by the Act. Nonetheless, the state may not impose any 
labeling or packaging requirements different from those required by the 
Act. 
The section on the Act's interaction with state law also includes a 
process under which states may introduce registrations for additional uses 
of federally registered pesticides "to meet special local needs." 
Flammable Fabrics Act. 15 U.S.C. §1203 (1994). States or political sub- 
divisions of states may not impose or continue to enforce flammability and 
related requirements upon the fabrics and other materials covered by the 
Act, unless those regulations are identical to the federal regulation. 
A state or political subdivision of a state may apply for an exemption 
to this rule, if (1) compliance with the proposed regulation does not result 
in a violation of another standard in the Act, (2) the regulation provides a 
"significantly higher degree of protection" from the risk of fire (the target 
of the federal regulation), and (3) it does not unduly burden interstate 
commerce. 
Note on history: The specific preemption language from which the 
above summary was taken was added in a 1976 amendment. 
James Henderson, denied this charge: "Henderson also shrugged off the plaintiffs' at- 
torneys' charges, saying tort reform was neither the goal of the project, nor the drafters' 
intent." Rather, Henderson described the the Restatement "as a fair and balanced recita- 
tion of current law and the rationale b hind it" (BNA Product Liability Daily, May 23, 
1997). That he ALI would take five years to tell the profession what anyone who read 
the cases already knew was predictable: the ALI only improves areas of the law that 
hardly matter (Schwartz and Scott, 1995). 
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Federal Hazardous Substances Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1261, notes (1994). The 
preemption provisions, here placed in the notes to the Act, are identical 
to those for the Flammable Fabrics Act above. 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act . 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 
(1994). No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall 
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion 
of any cigarettes, the packaging of which are labeled in conformity with 
the provisions of this chapter. 
Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970. 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (1994). The 
preemption provisions for this Act are identical in structure to those for 
the Flammable Fabrics Act above. 
Consumer Product Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1994) Whenever 
a consumer product safety standard under this chapter is in effect and 
applies to a risk of injury, no state may establish or continue in effect 
any provision which prescribes in relation to performance, composition, 
contents, design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling which are 
designed to deal with the same risk of injury, unless the requirements are 
identical to the requirements of the Federal standard. 15 U.S.C. §2075(b) 
(1994) 
Notwithstanding §2075(a), a state may create regulations that impose 
a higher standard of protection. 
The state or political subdivision of the state must apply to the Commis- 
sion for exemption from (a). Exemption will be granted if the following 
conditions are met: (1) The regulation provides significantly higher de- 
gree of protection from risk of injury. (2) The regulation does not unduly 
burden interstate commerce. 
Note on history: By amendment in 1976, language referring to a sig- 
nificantly higher level of performance was replaced by language referring 
to requirements that would "provide a significantly higher degree of pro- 
tection." 
Magnuson - Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 
15 U.S.C. §2311 (1994). This section contains an explicit statement that 
this chapter shall not invalidate any consumer right or remedy under state 
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law or any other federal law. In addition, the chapter is not to affect 
the liability of, or impose liability on, any person for personal injury, or 
supersede any provision of state law concerning consequential damages. 
State law concerning labeling or disclosure with respect to written war- 
ranties, and which is under the scope of the Act, shall not apply to written 
warranties unless the state law is identical to the federal aw. 
States may apply to the Commission for approval of requirements if 
these requirements provide greater protection for the consumer and does 
not unduly burden interstate commerce. 
Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. §2617 (1994). The preemp- 
tion structure for this act is substantially similar to that included in the 
Flammable Fabrics Act above. One difference is that the Administrator 
is given more authority within the Act to establish rules governing the 
testing of toxic substances. 
Federal Food , Drug , and Cosmetic Act. National uniform nutrition la- 
beling. 21 U.S.C. §343-1 (1994). Generally bars states from imposing 
labeling requirements on food that is interstate commerce. [An exception 
is made, however, for maple syrup.] 
A state or a political subdivision of a state may apply for an exemption 
from the bar on imposing labeling requirements, if (1) it would not cause 
any food to be in violation of any applicable federal requirement, (2) it 
would not unduly burden interstate commerce, and (3) it is designed to 
address a particular need not met by the federal requirements. 
Interstate sale of colored oleomargarine. 21 U.S.C. §347b (1994). Noth- 
ing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the possession, sale, or 
serving of colored oleomargarine or colored margarine in any State or 
Territory in contravention fthe laws of such State or Territory. 
Medical devices. 21 U.S.C. §360k (1994). No state or political sub- 
division of a state may establish any requirement different from the fed- 
eral requirements for devices, unless (1) the requirement is more stringent 
than the federal requirement, and (2) the requirement is "required by com- 
pelling local conditions," and (3) compliance with the requirement would 
not cause the device to be in violation of another applicable federal re- 
quirement under this chapter. 
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Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968. 21 U.S.C. §360pp 
(1994). Explicit statement that conformity with regulations will not relieve 
any person from liability at common law or statutory law. 
21 U.S.C. §360ss (1994). States and political subdivisions of states may 
not establish any requirement that is not identical to the federal standard if 
that requirement is applicable to an aspect of performance of an electronic 
product covered by the Act. States and political subdivisions of states may 
establish requirements with respect to emission of radiation of products 
for their own use , provided that these requirements are more restrictive 
than the otherwise applicable federal standard. 
National uniformity for nonprescription drugs. 21 U.S.C. A. §379r 
(West Supp. 1998). In reference to most drugs covered by the section, 
states or political subdivisions of states are prohibited from establishing 
requirements that differ from those in the Act, or in the Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.), or in the Fair Packaging 
and Labeling Act (15 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.). 
States may apply for an exemption from this prohibition if the proposed 
regulation (1) "protects an important public interest hat would otherwise 
be unprotected, including the health and safety of the children," (2) would 
not cause any drug to be in violation of any applicable requirement under 
federal law, and (3) would not unduly burden interstate commerce. 
In addition, this section does not apply to requirements adopted by 
state initiative or referendum enacted prior to September 1, 1997. 
In addition, §379r includes a section entitled "No effect on product 
liability law." According to this section, the larger section is not to "modify 
or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under the 
product liability of any State." 
Note on history: the provisions outlined above were introduced in an 
amendment effective November 21, 1997. 
Preemption for labeling or packaging of cosmetics. 21 U.S.C. A. §379s 
(West Supp. 1998). This section is substantially similar in structure to that 
of §379r above. 
Poultry and poultry products inspection. 21 U.S.C. §678 (1994). This 
section prohibits states from establishing new requirements with respect 
to premises, facilities, and operations of establishments governed by the 
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Act's inspection requirements, except that states may impose certain 
record keeping requirements. 
Occupational Health and Safety Act . 29 U.S.C. §667 (1994). This sec- 
tion of the Act permits state agencies and courts to assert jurisdiction 
concerning safety or health issues not addressed by OSHA. 
The section also includes procedures for states to apply to assume 
responsibility for developing and enforcing standards relating to issues 
regulated by OSHA. The Secretary may approve such petitions if the 
standards to be enforced by the state are (1) at least as effective as OSHA' s 
standards, (2) are "required by compelling local conditions," and (3) do 
not unduly burden interstate commerce. 
Other conditions, such as adequate funding and supervision, rights of 
inspection, and reporting requirements, are also to be considered by the 
Secretary. 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 33 U.S.C. §2718 (1994). The Act shall not 
prevent states from imposing additional liability or requirements with re- 
spect to the discharge of oil or other pollution in the state, or any removal 
activities in connection with such discharge. 
In addition, the Act is not to affect he liabilities of any person under 
the Waste Disposal Act or state law, including common law. 
Comprehensive Environmental Response , Compensation , and Liability Act 
of 1980. 42 U.S.C. §9614 (1994). The first subsection of this section 
declares that states are not preempted from imposing additional liability 
or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances. 
If certain compliance with the Act's regulations is performed, then 
the service station dealer may not be held liable under certain sections 
of the act, provided that the dealer complied with regulations. However, 
the section states that this does not affect he obligations or liability of 
any person under any other provision of state or federal law, including 
common law. In the area of financial responsibility, however, the federal 
requirements for the operators of vessels or facilities must be accepted 
by any state in lieu of that state's financial responsibility requirements, 
at least insofar as those regulations relate to liability for the release of 
hazardous substances. 
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National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-22 
(1997). State law is to apply to civil actions brought for damages in 
vaccine-related injury or death unless the suit concerns a situation in which 
proper warnings were given and the death or injury resulted from an un- 
avoidable side effect. 
The warnings will be considered proper for this inquiry if the manu- 
facturer complied with all of the federal warning requirements, unless the 
plaintiff shows (1) that the manufacturer engaged in some kind of fraud 
or other intentional misconduct during the vaccine's approval phase, or 
(2) the plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the manu- 
facturer failed to exercise due care notwithstanding the compliance with 
the federal requirements. 
No state may bar an individual from bringing a civil action against a 
manufacturer for vaccine-related injury unless the action is barred by this 
part of the Act. 
Federal Boat Safety Act . 43 U.S.C.A. §4306 (West Supp. 1998). Unless 
the Secretary issues an exemption, no state or political subdivision of a 
state may establish any requirement that is not identical to the applicable 
federal requirement, unless (barring the disapproval of the Secretary), the 
requirement relates to the carrying or use of marine safety articles "to 
meet uniquely hazardous conditions or circumstances within the State." 
Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §414 (1994). Nothing in the chapter is 
to abridge existing remedies under common law or by statute, but is to be 
in addition to such remedies. 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 49 U.S.C.A. §30103 
(1997). States are allowed to establish requirements if they mandate a 
"higher performance standard." 
The Act expressly states that compliance with its standards does not 
exempt a person from liability at common law. 
Federal Aviation Act. 49 U.S.C.A. §41713 (1997). This section prohibits 
states, political subdivisions of states, or "political authority of at least 2 
States" from enforcing law, regulations, or provisions relating to price, 
route or service. Exceptions are for certain transportation within Alaska, 
and for the proprietary rights of holders of certificates i sued by the De- 
partment of Transportation. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
54 American Law and Economics Review V2 N1 2000 (1-57) 
References 
American Law Institute. 1997. Restatement of the Law, Products Liability §4. 
Philadelphia: American Law Institute. 
American Law Institute Reporters' Study. 1991. Enterprise R sponsibility for Per- 
sonal Injury, Volume II, p. 100. 
Ausness, Richard C. 1996. "The Case for a 'Strong' Regulatory Compliance De- 
fense," 55 Maryland Law Review 1210-67. 
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1997. "Social Choice Theory, Game 
Theory, and Positive Political Theory," Discussion Paper No. 1196, Center for 
Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern 
University. 
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Repre- 
sentative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," 88 American Economic Review 
139-56. 
Binder, Sarah A., and Steven S. Smith. 1998. "Political Goals and Procedural 
Choice in the Senate," 60 Journal of Politics 398-416. 
BNA Product Liability Daily ,May 23, 1997. 
Campbell, Jack W., IV. 1998. "Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era," 
59 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 805-850. 
Chapman, Bruce, and Michael J. Trebilcock. 1992. "Making Hard Social Choices: 
Lessons from the Auto Accident Debate," 44 Rutgers Law Review 797-869. 
Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee. 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards," 2 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 279-304. 
Cupp, Richard L., Jr. 1997. "The 'Uncomplicated' Law of Products Liabil- 
ity: Reflections ofa Professor Turned Juror," 91 Northwestern Law Review 
1082-1107. 
Dixit, Avinash K. 1996. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost 
Politics Perspective. Munich Lectures in Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Elhauge, Einer R. 1991. "Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Ju- 
dicial Review?" 101 Yale Law Journal 31-110. 
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1995. "A Theory of Strategic Oversight: 
Congress, Lobbyists and the Bureaucracy," 11 Journal of Law, Economics &
Organization 227-55. 
Eskridge, William N., Jr. 1989. "Public Values in Statutory Interpretation," 137 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1007-1104. 
 . 1994. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- 
versity Press. 
Färber, Daniel A., and Philip P. Frickey. 1991. Law and Public Choice : A Critical 
Introduction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Regulatory Compliance Defense 55 
Ferejohn, John, and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. "Limitation fStatutes: Strategic 
Statutory Interpretation," 80 Georgetown Law Journal 565-82. 
Frailberg, Jeremy D., and Michael J. Trebilcock. 1998. "Risk Regulation: Techno- 
cratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform," 43McGill Law Journal 
835-87. 
Gehrlein, William V. 1998. "The Probability of a Condorcet Winner with a Small 
Number of Voters," 59 Economics Letters 317-21. 
Gillette, Clayton R, and James E. Krier. 1990. "Risk, Courts and Agencies," 138 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1027-1 09. 
Green, Michael D. 1997. " Cippilone Revisited: A Not So Little Secret About he 
Scope of Cigarette Preemption," 82 Iowa Law Review 1257-67. 
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. "Who Controls the Bureaucracy: 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureau- 
cratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making," 1 2 Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organization 119-68. 
Kolstad, Charles D., Thomas S. Ulen, and Gary V. Johnson. 1990. "Ex Post Lia- 
bility for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes orComplements?" 
80 American Economic Review 888-901. 
Kreimer, Seth F. 1984. "Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights 
in a Positive State," 132 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1293-1397. 
Levine, Michael E. 1998. "Regulatory Capture," 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and Law 267-7 1 .
Levine, Michael E., and Jennifer L. Forrance. 1990. "Regulatory Capture, Pub- 
lic Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis," 6 Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 167-98 (Special Issue). 
Luban, David. 1998. "A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages," 87 Georgetown 
Law Journal 359-80. 
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. "Learning from Oversight: Fire 
Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed," 10 Journal of Law Economics, &
Organization 96-125. 
Macey, Jonathan R. 1986. "Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: A  Interest Group Model," 86 Columbia Law Review 
223-68. 
Mashaw, Jerry L. 1997. Greed, Chaos and Governance : Using Public Choice to 
Improve Public Law. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
McCubbins, Mathew, Roger G. Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative 
Procedures a Instruments of Political Control," 3 Journal of Law, Economics 
& Organization 243-78. 
 . 1989. "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies," 75 Virginia Law Review 
431-82. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
56 American Law and Economics Review V2 N1 2000 (1-57) 
McCubbins, Mathew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," 28 American Journal of Polit- 
ical Science 165-79. 
Miller, Gary. 1997. "The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Sci- 
ence," 35 Journal of Economic Literature 1173-1204. 
Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public Choice II. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Olson, Mary K. 1999. "Agency Rulemaking, Political Influence, Regulation, 
and Industry Compliance," 15 Journal of Law ; Economics , & Organization 
573-601. 
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pakes, Ariel, and Paul McGuire. 1994. "Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilib- 
ria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model," 25 
Rand Journal of Economics 555-89. 
 . 1996. "Stochastic Algorithms for Dynamic Models: Markov Perfect Equi- 
librium and the 'Curse' of Dimensionality," mimeo, Yale University Depart- 
ment of Economics. 
Rabin, Robert L. 1997. "Federalism and the Tort System," 50 Rutgers Law Review 
1-31. 
Raz, Joseph. 1994. Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between 
the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: 
W.H. Freeman. 
Rubin, Paul H., John E. Calfee, and Mark F. Grady. 1997. "BMW vs. Gore: 
Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages," 5 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 179-216. 
Schwartz, Alan, and Robert E. Scott. 1995. "The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures," 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 595-654. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1984. "Uncovered Sets and So- 
phisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions," 28 
American Journal of Political Science 49-74. 
Sherman, Paul. 1992. "Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Ac- 
tions," 13 Whittier Law Review 831-908. 
Spiller, Pablo T., and Emerson H. Tiller. 1997. "Decision Costs and the Strategic 
Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review," 26 Journal of Legal 
Studies 347-70. 
Spitzer, Matthew L. 1988. "Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political 
Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory," 61 Southern California Law Review 
1293-1326. 
Stratmann, Thomas. 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of 
Contributions Everything?" 41 Journal of Law & Economics 85-113. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Regulatory Compliance Defense 57 
Sunstein, Cass R. 1990. After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory 
State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tabarrok, Alexander, and Eric Heiland. 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Econ- 
omy of Tort Awards," 42 Journal of Law & Economics 157-88. 
Tushnet, Mark. 1988. Red, White, and Blue : A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Van Deeman, Adrian. 1999. "The Probability of the Paradox of Voting for Weak 
Preference Orderings," 16 Social Choice & Welfare 171-82. 
Varian, Hal R. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis (3d ed.) New York: W.W. Norton. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman, and Charles J. Walsh. 
1994. "Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale 
for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense," 24 Seton Hall Law Review 
1437-80. 
Warren, Ashley W. 1997. "Compliance With Governmental Regulatory Standards: 
Is It Enough to Immunize a Defendant from Liability?" 49 Baylor Law Review 
763-816. 
Case References 
Lewis v. Brunswick Corporation, 107 F.3d 1494 (11 thCir. 1997), cert, dismissed, 
66 U.S.L.W. 3753 (1998) 
Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 
Myrick v. Frehauf Corp, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995) 
Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 816 (llthCir. 1989) 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.214 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:23:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
